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I. INTRODUCTION
As all school children in Spain and the United States learn,
European migration to the Caribbean began in 1492. A Spanish
expedition, financed by Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand, and
led by Christopher Columbus, himself a migrant from Genoa in
northern Italy, headed west across the Atlantic Ocean in an
attempt to chart a sea route to India and the rest of Asia.' From
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank Brooklyn
Law School for the generous research support extended through the sabbatical leave
policy and the summer research stipend program.
1. In 1492 Queen Isabella of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon conquered
Granada, the last Muslim kingdom in the Iberian Peninsula. This demonstration of
the combined power of the Catholic Monarchs, as they were known, was the beginning
of modern Spain, which at the time was a geographical description and not yet a
political entity. The successful Reconquista of the southern portion of the Iberian
Peninsula fueled an expansionist policy into North Africa and toward the Far East by
the Castilian crown. Indeed, as the investment in Columbus's expedition was solely a
Castilian effort, the lands Columbus discovered were Castilian possessions, and even
the Aragonese were considered foreigners there. See J.H. ELLIOTT, IMPERIAL SPAIN:
1469-1716 44-74 (1963).
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schoolbooks we know them as explorers, but contemporary dis-
course might refer to them as economic migrants.2 Sailing in
three ships, much smaller than the ships loaded with North Afri-
can and Chinese asylum seekers that create headlines when
detected near the European or American coasts today,3 the crew
first sighted land on October 12, 1492. Two weeks later they
arrived in Cuba,4 which Columbus thought was the fabled Asian
mainland. Later, when it became clear that Cuba was an island,'
and the nearby continent was not Asia, Spain claimed Cuba as its
first colony in the Americas.'
Since that time, Cuba has continued to play an important role
in Spanish migration. It has also figured prominently in the more
familiar migration story of the United States, particularly in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As this article will show, the
treatment of Cuban immigrants continues to have a major impact
on asylum policy in both Spain and the United States. Indeed,
Spain and the United States have a tradition of giving special con-
sideration to Cubans who seek asylum. The political symbolism of
welcoming refugees from Cuba and the emotional significance of
providing shelter to Cuban asylum seekers have been powerful
forces in shaping public policy in Spain as well as in the United
States.
The similarities between Spain's and the United States'
response to Cuban asylum seekers first caught my eye when I
moved to Spain in 2001. My research on asylum seekers entering
the European Union via Spain focused on the routes the majority
2. Columbus had negotiated with Ferdinand and Isabella to receive one tenth of
the products and merchandise in the new lands he reached. Id. at 60.
3. The Santa Maria, the largest, was little more than 100 feet (30 meters) long;
the Nina and the Pinta were each about 50 feet long. Santa Maria, Encyclopedia
Britannica Online (2003), available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=67287
(last visited June 17, 2003). In contrast, the Golden Venture, a freighter with
hundreds of asylum seekers that ran aground off New York City on 6/6/93, was 150
feet long. Steven Lee Myers, Captain and Crew charged in Voyage of Chinese to U.S.,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 8, 1993, at Al. A similar event occurred on 12/1/02 when a boat
traveling from Libya to Italy sank off the Italian coast, drowning at least 12. Frank
Bruni, Perilous Immigrant Crossings Frustrate Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at
A12.
4. Columbus landed on Cuba on October 29, 1492. ELIZABETH DE LIMA DANTAs,
HISTORICAL SETTING IN CUBA, A COUNTRY STUDY 6 (James D. Randolph, ed., 1987)
(1985).
5. The first Spaniard to circumnavigate Cuba was Sebastian de Ocampo in 1508.
Cuba, Encyclopedia Britannica (lth ed. 1911), available at http://71.1911
encyclopedia.org/C/CU/CUBA-htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2003).
6. Diego Veldzquez conquered Cuba in 1511. DE LiaIA DATrs, supra note 4, at 7.
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of asylum seekers took, from North Africa to Spain.7 I learned
that the numbers of individuals who applied for asylum in Spain
were surprisingly low for a western European country, fewer than
10,000 per year,' and the percentage of those who received asylum
was shockingly low, less than 6%.' Nonetheless, local newspapers
were full of articles about asylum seekers and economic
migrants." News stories about small boats known as pateras that
were landing on the southern coast of Spain and in the Canary
Islands, complete with photographs of sub-Saharan Africans res-
cued from the water, conveyed the feeling of an invasion"
Amid the slightly hysterical news reports, I began to notice
articles documenting an increasing number of Cubans who were
7. Comision Espanola De Ayuda Al Refugiado (CEAR), Informe 2003, La
Situacion De Los Refugiados En Espana, 65 [Spanish Commission to Assist Refugees,
2003 Report, The Situation of Refugees in Spain] [hereinafter CEAR, 2003 Report]
(showing that Nigeria, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, together with Cuba and Colombia, were the main countries of origin of
asylum seekers in Spain in 2002).
8. Memoria De La Oficina De Asilo Y Refugio Ano 2000, at 2, Figura 1.1[Annual
Report of the Asylum and Refugee Office for the Year 2000] [hereinafter OAR, Annual
Report for 2000] (showing 6,764 asylum seekers in Spain in 1998, 8405 in 1999, 7926
in 2000. In comparison, Germany received 98,640 asylum seekers in 1998, 95,113 in
1999, and 78,764 in 2000. France received 22,370, 30,830, and 38,588 respectively in
the same three years. Belgium received 21,960, 35,780, and 42, 691, while the United
Kingdom received 59,830, 91,390, and 76,450). Id. at 4. Similar numbers have
requested asylum recently, with Spain receiving 9,490 asylum applications in 2001
and 6,309 in 2002. See Delegacion del Gobierno para ]a Extranjeria y la Inmigracion,
Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of Interior, Office of Immigration and Aliens], at
Tabla VI.2, Tabla VIII.2, available at www.mir.es/dgei (last visited Aug. 21, 2003).
9. PABLO SANTOLAYA MACHETrI, EL DERECHO DE AsILO EN LA CONSTITUCI6N
ESPAHOLA [The Right of Asylum Under the Spanish Constitution] 91 (2001)
[hereinafter THE RIGHT OF AsYLUM]. Santolaya reports that 4600 received refugee
status and 1600 received humanitarian protection, a lesser form of protection.
Together, these 6400 successful applicants constituted 8% of the asylum requests
filed in Spain between 1990 and 1999. Those who received refugee status constituted
5.8% of the applicants.
10. See e.g., Aznar: Hay que desincentivar la inmigracion ilegal, EL MUNDo, May
27, 2002, at 12; M. Pino Perez, El Gobierno regional celebra que Aznar "se
comprometa" al traslado de inmigrantes, LA PROVINCIA CANARIAS, May 28, 2002 at 6;
TomAs Bdrbulo, Government to Shelter Immigrants to Fuerteventura in Disused
Military Base, EL PAIS (English ed.), Dec. 18, 2001.
11. See e.g., F. Berenguer, Detenidos 53 inmigrantes subsaharianos tras arribar a
una playa de Tuineje, CANARiAS 7, May 27, 2002, at 72; Trillo plantea el uso del
Ejercito en tareas de observacion frente a las pateras, LA PROVINCIA CANARIAS, May 28,
2002, at 6; Tomds Birbulo, Massive Wave of Illegal Crossings to Canary Islands
Expected from Morocco, EL PAIS (English ed.), Nov. 10, 2001, at 1; Tomis Bdrbulo,
Situation Terminal in Fuerteventura as Immigrants' Airport Stay Lengthens, EL PAlS
(English ed.), Dec. 17, 2001; Jerome Socolovsky, Emigrants from Africa Risk Watery
Grave, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 19, 2001; Suzanne Daley, African Migrants Risk All on
Passage to Spain, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 2001, at Al.
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arriving at the Madrid airport and requesting asylum."2 According
to the press, these asylum seekers, generally passengers on flights
from Havana to Moscow who filed asylum applications during
their stopover in Madrid, did not, in most cases, receive asylum. 3
The Spanish authorities decided that the great majority of them
lacked a well-founded fear of persecution in Cuba. Nevertheless,
journalists reported that the Spanish officials did not send the
rejected asylum seekers back to Cuba. 4 Instead, the immigration
officers granted the Cubans temporary residence permits," which
enabled them, despite their lack of entry visas, to enter Spain and
try to find a job, a place to live, and a means to regularize their
legal status.
To my American ears, this sounded similar to the long-stand-
ing treatment of Cubans who reach the United States: whether
they can prove a well-founded fear of persecution or not, the
Cuban refugees are allowed to enter and, ultimately, transform
their temporary status into lawful permanent residence. 6 I
noticed that the press was critical of the Spanish policy, but not of
the decision to admit the rejected Cuban asylum seekers to Spain.
Rather, the newspapers criticized the authorities for not providing
longer temporary residence permits."
I heard other echoes. The Spanish press published many
reports in which refugee advocates argued that it was unfair to
grant special treatment to Cuban asylum seekers.18 They argued
that the treatment that Cubans automatically received should
also be afforded to asylum seekers from other nations, such as
Colombia, where people faced danger. 9 In the United States, the
12. See, e.g., Tomds Bdrbulo, Barajas Airport the New Gateway for Cuban Asylum
Seekers, EL PAIS (English ed.), Jan. 3, 2002, at 1.
13. See, e.g., Cubans in Barajas, EL PAs, (English ed.), Jan. 7, 2002, at 2.
14. See, e.g., Bdtrbulo, supra note 12, at 1. See also CEAR, 2003 Report, supra note
7, at 75, 122-123.
15. See, e.g., Tomds Bdrbulo, Government Says Worried Over "Avalanche" of
Cuban Arrivals, EL PAls (English ed.), Jan. 5, 2002, at 1; see also Art. 25.4 of the
Aliens Law, Organic Law 8/2000 of Dec. 22, 2000, amending Organic Law 4/2000 of
Jan. 11, 2000, Concerning the Rights, Liberties, and Social Integration of Aliens in
Spain, infra note 124 (providing that foreigners who do not satisfy the entry
requirements may be admitted to the country for humanitarian reasons).
16. See supra text accompanying notes 143-148.
17. See, e.g., Bbrbulo, supra note 14, at 1.
18. E.g., Tom.s Birbulo, Cubans Seeking Asylum Given Priority Over Other
Refugees, EL PAs (English ed.), Jan. 2, 2002, at 1; see also Cubans in Barajas, EL
PAs, (English ed.), Jan. 7, 2002, at 2 (editorial responding to criticisms of positive
discrimination in favor of Cubans).
19. See, e.g., Birbulo, supra note 12, at 1 (noting the differential treatment of
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overpowering contrast was between the differential treatment of
Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers."
Soon I discovered yet another resonance. The growing num-
bers of Cuban asylum seekers in Spain, the continuing criticism of
the preferential treatment of those that are rejected, and the polit-
ical pressure generated by the notion that Cubans had found a
chink in the armor of 'Fortress Europe' led the Spanish govern-
ment in 2002 to take steps to prevent Cuban asylum seekers from
touching down on Spanish soil. Spain imposed a transit visa
requirement on Cubans, which means that Spanish consular offi-
cials stationed in Cuba will be able to prevent potential Cuban
defectors from even boarding airplanes that stop in Spain. 1
Again, there are parallels to United States policy. In the mid-
1990s, in response to a concern about growing numbers of Cubans
embarking in small boats, the United States adopted measures to
try to stop Cuban asylum seekers at the source in Cuba. After
several years of attempts to justify differential treatment between
Haitians and Cubans and in light of a substantial increase in
Cuban balseros, or boat people, headed for Florida, the United
States began patrolling the seas around Cuba to intercept Cuban
asylum seekers.22 Under current policy, U.S. ships take the inter-
cepted Cubans directly to the U.S. Naval Base in Cuba at Guantd-
namo Bay, from which they are sent back to Havana."
I had always thought of the preferential treatment afforded to
Cubans arriving in the United States as a peculiarly American
response to migrants and refugees from a neighboring country
that stood as a communist outpost close to American shores. In
light of the geographical distance between Cuba and Europe and
the less heated political responses that European nations have
displayed toward communist governments, I was surprised to
encounter in Spain the phenomenon of Cuban exceptionalism with
Colombian and Cuban asylum seekers, and the related decision to boycott Spain
announced by Nobel prize winning author Gabriel Garcia Marquez).
20. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, Haitian Immigrants in U.S. Face a Wrenching Choice,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2000, at Al; Noah Isakson, Immigration Inequity Cited: Cubans
Welcome, Haitians in Limbo, Jackson Says, CHIC. TRIB., Apr. 26, 2000, at N3; Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., America's Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and
Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 755 (2000); Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism,
and Reparations: A Critique of the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45
STAN. L. Rev. 687 (1993).
21. See supra text accompanying notes 296-98.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 249-58.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
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which I was familiar in the United States.24
I wondered whether similar factors explained the Cuban pol-
icy in Spain and in the United States. There is a substantial liter-
ature in the United States that examines the historical origins of
the welcome provided to Cubans seeking asylum in the United
States. Many articles have explored the political significance of
the American response to Cubans fleeing their homeland.2" Dur-
ing the Cold War, the flight of thousands of refugees to the land of
liberty from the clutches of communism was a powerful symbol.
United States policy had certainly welcomed refugees from com-
munist regimes before - witness the special programs for Hun-
garian refugees after the failed revolution of 195626- but the
Cubans were close neighbors, which carried an extra impact.
Perhaps a similar explanation might pertain to Spain.
Franco, after all, was a ferocious anti-Communist27 who led the
nationalist rebels in the Spanish Civil War, and publicly
denounced the opponents as the forces of "Red" terror. When
Franco assumed control after the nationalists won, he promptly
severed all diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and refused
to recognize other communist governments that came to power in
24. 1 soon learned that preferential treatment for Cubans was a Spanish policy,
not a European one, just as the U.S. policy favoring Cubans is not the approach taken
by the rest of North America. Canada and Mexico have sheltered Cubans, but have
not adopted an open-door policy. No other European country receives a significant
number of Cuban asylum seekers, and none has provided a special welcome for
Cubans. Cuba was not even listed among the top 40 countries of origin of asylum
seekers arriving in Europe from 2000 through 2002. See, e.g., European Commission
on Refugees and Exiles, Quick Facts, Origin of asylum applicants in Europe, 2000-
2002, Table 8, available at www.ecre.org/factfile/facts.shtml (last visited Aug. 21,
2003). However, Cuba was routinely among the top 3 or 4 countries of origin of
asylum seekers who filed applications in Spain during the same time. See
DELEGACION DEL GOBIERNO PARA LA EXTRANJERIA Y LA INMIGRACION, MINISTERIO DEL
INTERIOR, Anuario Estadistico de Extranjeria 1996-2002, General Solicitudes y
Solicitantes de Asilo segan Continente de Origen, Table VI.2, Table VIII.2, available at
www.mir.es/dgei (last visited Aug. 21, 2003).
25. See, e.g., MARIo ANTONIO RIVERA, DECISION AND STRUCTURE: U.S. REFUGEE
POLICY IN THE MARIEL CRISIS (1991); LYNN DARRELL BENDER, THE POLITICS OF
HOSTILITY (1975); Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: Mirando por los Ojos de
Don Quijote o Sancho Panza? 114 HARv. L. REV. 902 (2001); Maria E. Sartori, The
Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the U.S. Policy of Temporary
Protection in Offshore Safe Havens, 15 GEO. IMMIIGR. L.J. 319 (2001); Joyce A. Hughes,
Flight from Cuba ,36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39 (1999); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz,
Immigration Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Transition Cuba, 16 BERKELEY
J. INTL L. 234 (1998); Katherine Tonnas, Out of a Far Country: The Sojourns of
Cubans, Vietnamese, Haitians, and Chinese to America, 20 S.U. L. REv. 295 (1993).
26. See DALGLISH, supra note 144.
27. See supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text (discussing Franco's intense
anti-Communism and the specific points mentioned in this paragraph).
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Eastern Europe and in Asia. In fatbol-mad Spain, Franco even
cancelled the European Cup match between the Spanish and
Soviet teams, rather than allow the Soviet flag to fly and the
Soviet anthem to sound publicly in Spain. 8 In light of this politi-
cal setting, a Cold War motive to shelter Cubans fleeing from a
communist regime may have prompted the Spanish policy favor-
ing Cuban asylum seekers.
I decided to examine the situation more closely. I wanted to
understand the parameters of the preferential treatment of
Cubans in Spain, and I wanted to look in greater detail at the
factors that might have given rise to the pro-Cuban policy. First, I
studied the history of migration between Spain and Cuba and
between Cuba and the United States. As this article details,
throughout Cuba's colonial period, Cuban migration was, in effect,
a revolving door. Hundreds of thousands of Spaniards went to
Cuba, and many thousands returned to Spain. For many of those
people, this round trip was made on multiple occasions. There
was a similar revolving door between Cuba and the United States.
Although the numbers were much smaller, thousands of Cubans
traveled to the United States from colonial Cuba, often more than
once. Indeed, famous Cuban political exiles, including Jos6 Marti
and Fidel Castro, spent temporary periods in the United States.
Second, this article examines the evolving Spanish policies
towards Cubans who left their homeland after Castro came to
power in 1959. It compares the Spanish reception of Cubans in
the 1960s and 1970s with the U.S. response during that same
period. There are major similarities, but also important differ-
ences. As this study reveals, the Spanish welcomed Cuban asy-
lum seekers with open arms, but did so with the knowledge that
most of the Cubans viewed Spain as a transit country, merely one
stop on their journey to the United States.
Third, this article surveys the Spanish policies favoring
Cuban asylum seekers during the 1990s and the new, more
restrictive policies the Spanish government put in place in 2002.
Again, as indicated earlier, there are powerful similarities in the
long-standing preferential policies for Cubans who reach the bor-
ders of both countries, as well as in the recent Spanish and U.S.
policy changes that attempt to prevent asylum seekers from even
leaving Cuba. Spain and the United States differ, though, in the
numbers of asylum seekers, the size and political strength of the
28. Canceling the 1960 match triggered a substantial fine against the Spanish
Soccer Federation. STANLEY G. PAYNE, THE FRANo REGIME: 1936-1975 531 (1987).
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Cuban immigrant community, and the geographical barriers that
Cubans fleeing their homeland have to overcome. Moreover, the
United States coupled its restrictive measures with alternative
avenues for entry into the United States, and there is no
equivalent policy in Spain.
Fourth, my study of migration to and from Cuba starkly
revealed one of history's ironies. The 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees,29 the post World War II effort to enshrine
protection of refugees in international law, has not been used in
either Spain or the United States to afford safety to Cuban refu-
gees. Although Spain and the United States have generously
sheltered many who fled fears of persecution in Cuba, they used
general immigration measures to admit Cubans to their shores.
For decades, neither Spain nor the United States asked whether
the Cubans had well-founded fears of persecution, presuming,
instead, that they were all refugees. At the end of the twentieth
century, this began to change. Both Spain and the United States
started to apply the international refugee standards to Cubans,
and the numbers of Cubans receiving refuge plummeted. While
these policies did not necessarily violate the legal standards set
forth in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the framers of the conven-
tion would likely have been dismayed to see its emergence as an
instrument to halt migration.
II. MIGRATION AND COLONIAL CUBA
A. Cuba and Spain
The migration flows between Spain, Cuba, and America first
developed in the early sixteenth century. When Ferdinand and
Isabella realized that their sailors had reached a new continent,
they decided to expand and protect the Spanish claim to the new
lands by establishing strong colonies. Soon, Spanish ships were
ferrying conquistadors to the Americas. Rumors of wealth in the
new land attracted many immigrants from Spain, and Cuba
became the gateway for explorers who ventured further into the
Americas, to Florida, Mexico, Peru and beyond. The encomienda
system," through which those who invested in the exploration
received title to a proportional share of the land conquered in the
29. Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
30. The encomienda system had been used earlier by Isabella in the Reconquista
of the Muslim-ruled lands in the Iberian Peninsula. Conquistadors assisting in this
military effort received royal grants that provided them with jurisdiction over
534
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name of the monarchs, encouraged many to join the ranks of the
conquistadors. Entrepreneurial migrants"' created a series of
Spanish settlements that stretched from the southern tip of South
America to the southern region of the current-day United States."
Cuba was a vitally important colony. It was the seat of sub-
stantial Spanish power in the new world. In addition to serving as
a staging ground for Spanish journeys further into the Americas,
it became a major administrative center of the Spanish colonial
empire. Furthermore, it provided a source of great wealth for the
Spanish crown, sending shipments of copper, tobacco and sugar to
Spain.3
In return, Spain sent Cuba large numbers of migrants from
Extremadura in the southwest,34 Galicia in the northwest, other
poor regions of the Iberian Peninsula, and the Canary Islands."
portions of the newly conquered land and those living on it. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at
68-69.
31. Making one's fortune, or at least making a living, has always played a notable
role in migration. One current example of this motivation can be seen in those known
as treaty traders and investors in current U.S. immigration parlance. U.S.
immigration law provides visas to those who contribute to the U.S. economy by
investing in it or by generating substantial trade with the U.S. These individuals
must be from countries that have treaties of investment, free trade, or commerce and
navigation with the U.S. The current requirements include a substantial investment,
typically in the amount of $1,000,000, that must generate significantly more income
than is necessary to provide for the investor and his or her family, or it must have a
significant economic impact in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000); 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2 (2003). For a recent discussion of US policy concerning immigration visas for
immigrant investors, see Lincoln Stone, Immigrant Investment in Local Clusters, 80
INTERPRETER RELEASES 837 (June 16, 2003).
32. Ponce de Leon led a Spanish expedition to Florida in 1513. After ceding the
Florida colony to Great Britain and later receiving it back, Spain ceded Florida to the
United States in 1819. See Florida, in FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003),
available at LEXIS, Reference, General. Spaniards under the leadership of Juan Diaz
de Solis reached Argentina in an expedition in 1515-1516. See Argentina, in FUNK &
WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at LEXIS, Reference, General. The
Spanish conquest of the Inca rulers in Chile took place during 1536-1540. See Chile,
in FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at LEXIS, Reference,
General.
33. DE LimA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 10. Spain monopolized all trade from its
American colonies. North America, in FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003),
available at LEXIS, Reference, General.
34. Some of the most famous conquistadors, such as Francisco Pizarro, who
conquered the Inca civilization in Peru, came from Trujillo in Extremadura.
HAMMOND INNES, THE CONQUISTADORS 22 (1969). Hernan Cortes, who conquered the
Aztec empire in Mexico, came from Medillin in Extremadura. Id. Vasco Nufiez de
Balboa, the first Spaniard to cross Panama and see the Pacific Ocean, also hailed
from Extremadura from the town Jerez de los Caballeros. Vasco Nuiiez de Balboa, in
FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at LEXIS, Reference,
General.
35. MANUEL R. MORENO FRAGINALES & JOSE J. MORENO MASO, GUERRA,
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There was also a sizeable migration of Spanish settlers from other
colonies in the West Indies. For example, when England took con-
trol of Jamaica from Spain in 1656, a group of 8,000 Spanish
colonials left Jamaica for Cuba.36 When Spain ceded its portion of
Santo Domingo to France in 1795, Spanish settlers left the
French-controlled territory for Cuba. 7
This pattern repeated itself during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries as other Spanish colonies in the Americas came
under the control of other European powers or achieved indepen-
dence from Spain. 8 However, the Spanish mainland continued to
dominate the migration to Cuba. Reliable migration statistics are
unavailable because, in effect, many viewed Cuba as another,
albeit distant, Spanish province, and saw little need to document
the migration of Spanish nationals within the provinces. 9 None-
theless, it is clear that Spanish immigrants continued to flock to
Cuba in large numbers. More than 52,000 Spanish men immi-
grated to Cuba between 1846 and 1862.40 Over 163,000 Spaniards
immigrated to Cuba between 1868 and 1880.41 Close to 254,000
Spanish immigrants journeyed to Cuba between 1881 and 1894,42
followed by 47,000 more in the last few years of the century.'
Spanish migration to Cuba continued to have both
entrepreneurial and expeditionary elements. While many came to
MIGRACION, Y MuERTE: EL EJERCITo ESPAROL EN CUBA COMO VIA MIGRATORIO 109
(1993). Although early statistics are unreliable, records show, for example, that
between 1846 and 1862 there were 34,000 male immigrants to Cuba from the Spanish
mainland and 18,000 male immigrants to Cuba from the Canary Islands. Id. at 61.
Later, between 1850 and 1950, 3.5 million Spaniards left from Galicia, Asturias, and
the Canary Islands to work in Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay, and other American
countries. Nieves Ortega Perez, Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy, MIGRATION
INFORMATION SOURCE (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.migrationinformation.org
Profiles/print.cfm?ID=97.
36. Rolando Garcia Quinones, International Migrations in Cuba: Persisting
Trends and Changes, An Old Phenomenon, 3 n.2, Sistema Econ6mico
Latinoamericano (2002), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/-sela/AA2K2/ENG/docs/
Coop/migra/spsmirdil2-02/spsmirdil2-1.htm (last visited May 29, 2003) [hereinafter
An Old Phenomenon]; England took control of Jamaica from Spain in 1655. England,
in FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at LEXIS, Reference,
General.
37. Spanish soldiers returned to Cuba after several attempts to regain control of
Santo Domingo. MORENO & MORENO, supra note 35, at 84-85.
38. Spanish colonials came to Cuba from Louisiana, Florida, Peru, Bolivia, and
Mexico. Id. at 46-47.
39. An Old Phenomenon, supra note 36, at 1-2.
40. MORENO & MORENO, supra note 35, at 61.
41. Id. at 99.
42. Id. at 121.
43. Id. at 132.
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seek their fortune, more came as conscripts. In total, Spanish mil-
itary forces sent over 700,000 soldiers, sailors, and administrators
to Cuba during the four centuries of colonial rule." Many military
men remained in Cuba; others went back to Spain, but later
returned to Cuba to settle.45 This large movement of Spanish
soldiers and sailors dwarfed the number of civilian migrants and
matched the number of enslaved Africans transported involunta-
rily to Cuba during the colonial epoch. 46 The huge volume of Span-
ish military forces who went to, and often remained in, Cuba
increased Spanish migration to Cuba and created still more con-
nections between Spain and Cuba.
Many colonial families maintained strong ties with Spain and
with their Spanish compatriots in Cuba. The networks, consisting
of family members and neighbors from the same Spanish village,
in turn, encouraged further migration from those regions in
Spain. Other reasons for migration existed as well, including eco-
nomic problems. For example, dire economic conditions in Galicia
during the mid-nineteenth century caused many Galicians to con-
sider migration to Cuba.4" In fact, between 1840 and 1859
Galicians composed the largest group of Spanish migrants to
Cuba.48 At the same time, the increasing presence of Spanish
companies in Cuba made it easy for Spaniards to emigrate to the
island. No longer did Spaniards consider the military as the only
means of reaching Cuba.49 The Galician peasants who had settled
in Cuba attracted other Galicians to consider moving there. They
even organized a Galician Society in Havana in 1871, which sup-
ported the continuing connection between people in Cuba and
44. MORENO & MORENO, supra note 35. During the last half of the 19th century
alone, Spanish troops sent to Cuba numbered more than 510,000. From 1868 to 1880,
military forces totaling 209,000 were sent to Cuba. Id. at 99. From 1881 to 1895,
83,000 Spanish troops went to Cuba. Id. at 121. From 1895 to 1899, approximately
220,000 Spanish troops were ordered to Cuba. Id. at 132.
45. Between 1868 and 1880, 209,000 Spanish troops were sent to Cuba; 63,000 of
them returned to Spain. Id. at 101. Between 1887 and 1899, 346,000 Spanish troops
were sent to Cuba; 146,000 troops returned, and 200,000, or 57.6%, remained. Id. at
136.
46. Because the forced migration of slave labor is beyond the scope of this article,
the text does not refer to the migration of slaves from Africa, which reached its height
in the 19th century; nor to the importation of Chinese "coolie" labor, which occurred
under circumstances similar to slavery. There are estimates that roughly 800,000
African slaves were brought to Cuba between the 17th and 19th centuries, and that
close to 125,000 Chinese laborers were imported during the second half of the 19th
century. Id. at 1.
47. MORENO & MORENO, supra note 35, at 66.
48. Id. at 65-66.
49. Id. at 114, 134-35.
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Spain.50
Indeed, the careers of two major contemporary political
figures attest to the migration from Spain to Cuba during the
nineteenth century. Angel Maria Castro, the son of a poor farmer
in Galicia, was sent by the Spanish army to fight against the
Cuban revolutionaries in the 1895 War of Independence.5 1 He
went back to Spain with the defeated Spanish army, but returned
to Cuba in the early years of the twentieth century.52 By the time
his son Fidel was born in the Cuban countryside in 1926, Angel
Castro had developed from a penniless immigrant into an entre-
preneur and a landowner.53 In 1992, Fidel Castro, the pre-emi-
nent Cuban figure of the twentieth century visited his ancestral
village in rural Galicia. "My father always wanted to return
here," said Fidel, as cousins welcomed him54 and the Galician gov-
ernment offered him a retirement home.55
Around the same time that Castro's father left Galicia for
Cuba, so did Manuel Fraga Bello. In Cuba he met and married a
woman from Galicia and started a family.56 Their son, Manuel
Fraga Iribarne,57 lived in Cuba as a child,," but later returned to
Spain. He became an important minister in Franco's government
in the 1960s and was instrumental in developing tourism in
Spain.59 After Franco died, Fraga formed a conservative political
party, the People's Alliance, and vied for power in the first demo-
cratic elections in 40 years.6 Now the government leader of Gali-
50. JOAQJIN Roy, LA SIEMPRE FIEL: UN SIGLO DE RELACIONES HIsPANo CUBANAS
1898-1998 41 (1998).
51. FIDEL CASTRO, My EARLY YEARS 29 (Deborah Shnookal & Pedro Alvarez Tabio,
eds., 1998).
52. Id. at 29.
53. Angel Castro worked for a U.S. owned sugar mill and later leased land from
the United Fruit Company to launch his own successful sugar plantation. CLIVE
Foss, FIDEL CASTRO 2 (2000). He died a wealthy landowner on October 21, 1956, two
months after Fidel's 30th birthday. CASTRO, supra note 51, at 30-31.
54. Castro Visits His Father's Spanish Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at A3.
55. Phil Davison, Francoist PM Set For New Term, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
October 16, 1993, at 9.
56. Castro Visits His Father's Spanish Home, supra note 54, at A3.
57. Fraga is the president of the government of Galicia, one of the 17 autonomous
communities in Spain. As such, Fraga is somewhat akin to a governor of one of the
states in the U.S., yet more powerful because decentralization and regional autonomy
is much greater in Spain than in the U.S. Moreover, Fraga has been a prominent
figure in national politics in Spain for 40 years. Davison, supra note 55.
58. Mauricio Vincent, iBienvenido, Mtster Fraga!, EL PAIS (Madrid), Nov. 2, 1998.
59. Mauricio Vincent, Manuel Fraga Inicia un Viaje de 12 Dias a Cuba, Mexico y
Guatemala, EL PAIS (Barcelona), Oct. 29, 1998, at 26; Davison, supra note 55; see also
PAYNE, supra note 28, at 400-01, 504-12.
60. JOHN HOOPER, THE NEW SPANIARDS 37 (1995). Fraga's party won only 16 seats
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cia and the mentor of Jos6 Maria Aznar, the Prime Minister of
Spain from 1996 to 2004, Fraga,6 1 has made two official trips to
Cuba62 and pronounces himself the son of immigrants. 3
The Cuban immigration stories of the Castro and Fraga fami-
lies are not isolated coincidences. In fact, they are prototypes.
The thrifty, hard-working Galician is the Cuban stereotype of a
Spanish immigrant,' and the Cuban nickname for all Spaniards,
no matter their region of origin, is "Galician."65
B. Cuba and the United States
While the major migratory flows crossed the Atlantic from
Spain to Cuba and sometimes back again to Spain, there were also
significant movements of people between Cuba and the United
States. Cuba, the largest and most populous island in the Carib-
bean, struggled for more than a century with the Spanish monop-
oly on trade with the colony. The situation improved when Cuba
emerged from the Spanish monopoly on trade in the 18th century
and received special privileges from Spain.6 Cuba became rela-
tively autonomous during Spain's war with France in the early
19th century and there was talk of Cuban independence. At the
same time in the United States, the powerful new nation to the
north, there was talk of annexation of Cuba."
Cuban emigration to the United States came alive in the nine-
teenth century.' By 1870, 12,000 Cubans had put down roots in
the United States. This number increased to 20,000 by 1890,
and to 40,000 by 1910.70 There were vocal Cuban exile groups in
in the 1977 general elections, but he and his party continued to be active in the
elections in 1979, 1982 and 1986. Id. at 56, 65.
61. Davison, supra note 55.
62. Fraga traveled to Cuba as president of the Government of Galicia in 1991 and
again in 1998. Vincent, supra note 59.
63. E-mail from Manuel Fraga Iribarne, President, Xunta of Galicia, to author's
research assistant, Brooklyn Law School (March 7, 2003, 11:34:39 EST): "I am, in
effect, the son of emigrants who met in Cuba. Two of my siblings were born there."
(On file with author.) Fraga's family moved from Cuba back to Galicia, where Manuel
Fraga was born on November 23, 1922, and then returned to Cuba where Manuel
spent his childhood. Vincent, supra note 59.
64. CONSUELO MARTIN FERNANDEZ & VICENTE ROMAN, LA EMIGRACION CUBANA EN
ESPANA 23 (1994).
65. Id.
66. DE L m DANrAs, supra note 4, at 10-11.
67. Id. at 13.
68. An Old Phenomenon, supra note 36, at 3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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New York and Florida, which encouraged Cubans to revolt against
the Spanish colonial administrators,71 a revolution that ultimately
encompassed three wars and close to 30 years of fighting. Many
important Cuban political leaders, including Jos6 Marti, the
mythic 19th century Cuban revolutionary, spent substantial por-
tions of their exile in the United States.72
Cuban rebels took up arms against the Spanish forces in
Cuba during the Ten Years' War, which ended in 1878 when
Spain agreed to a degree of autonomy for Cuba.73 The peace was
short-lived. Disappointed with the superficial political changes,
angered that Spain had curtailed trading between Cuba and the
United States, and outraged that the Spanish Governor of Cuba
suspended constitutional guarantees, Jos6 Marti and other lead-
ers of the Ten Years' War again rebelled in the War for Indepen-
dence in 1895.11 Some forces sought revolution while others
demanded reform; regardless of the motives, however, fierce fight-
ing took place. The United States sent food to Cuban civilians,
and threatened military intervention in aid of the rebels.75 Spain
offered Cuba greater autonomy, with ultimate power retained by
the Spanish Captain General.76
Two months after the end of this war, in February 1898, the
American battleship U.S.S. Maine exploded in the Havana harbor
and the United States declared war on Spain. Thus, began the
battle over the remaining portion of Spain's American empire.
Many Cuban exile groups in the United States lobbied for Cuba's
71. Hundreds of exiled Cuban separatists resettled in New York City, Key West
and New Orleans during the 1870s. New York City served as headquarters for Cuban
nationalist and anti-imperialist groups, including Martfs Cuban Revolutionary
Party. ROBERT L. BACH, Cubans, in REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES 78-79 (David W.
Haines, ed., 1985). See also DE LiMA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 18 (stating that Marti,
hailed as the "Apostle of Independence", organized Cuban exiles in the U.S).
72. Jos6 Marti, famous both as a literary figure and a political leader, was exiled
from Cuba in 1869. He lived in Spain and the U.S., among other countries, during his
exile. From 1881 to 1895, he was the leading voice in the U.S. calling for Cuban
liberation from Spain. DE LimA DANTAs, supra note 4, at 18.
73. Ten Years' War, in FUNK & WAGNALLS N~w ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at
LEXIS, Reference, General.
74. DE LImA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 19-20 (containing a brief time line of events
following Martfs return to Cuba to his death in battle on 5/19/1895).
75. Encyclopedia Britannica, Cuba (11th ed. 1911) available at http://71.1911
encyclopedia.org/CICU/CUBA.htm (last visited June 17, 2003); see also Spanish-
American War, in FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at
LEXIS, Reference, General.
76. Autonomy was offered by Spain in October 1897, and put into effect in
December 1897. Id.
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independence from Spain77 and applauded the U.S. destruction of
the Spanish naval fleet in Cuba. 8 The Spanish-American War
proceeded quickly and by the end of 1898, Spain had given up its
claim to its last remaining American colony.7 9 The loss of Cuba, a
land that had loomed large in the popular imagination of Spain as
well as in its political history, was a great blow to the Spanish
population.
III. MIGRATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA
Although Spain gave up its claim to Cuba, a self-declared
republic, Cuba was not independent. The United States occupied
Cuba for the next three years, withdrawing in 1902 after ensuring
that the new Cuban Constitution allowed the United States the
right to intervene in the future. 0 A succession of Cuban govern-
ments, U.S. interventions, chaos and corruption followed.
During this time, migration, which had increased at the end
of the nineteenth century, continued to grow. New Spanish
migrants arrived in Cuba; soldiers sent to put down the rebellion
came under the Cuban spell and remained to seek their f6rtune
after the Spanish military withdrew,8 while Cuban 6migr6s left
the United States and headed back to their homeland.82 At the
same time, a number of settlers left Cuba for Spain.83
77. DE LiMA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 20.
78. July 3, 1898. Id. at 21.
79. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754.
80. The Platt Amendment provided, among other things, that "the government of
Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the
protection of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the
protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations
with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be
assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba." Platt Amendment, ch. 803, 31
Stat. 895-98 (1901); CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA, art. III (Platt
Amendment) (1901). The United States saw strategic importance in Cuba's
geographical location: 90 miles from Florida and controlling the Windward Passage
from the Atlantic Ocean into the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, the mouth of the
Mississippi River, and the Panama Canal. Pursuant to the United States-Cuba
Treaty of 1903, the United States maintains a 45 square mile naval base at
Guantdnamo Bay on the southeastern coast of Cuba. Treaty on Relations with Cuba,
May 22, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2248. The Treaty on Relations of 1934 between
Cuba and the United States reaffirmed the pre-existing arrangement concerning U.S.
control over the Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base. Relations with Cuba, May 29, 1934,
U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 866.
81. See discussion supra note 45.
82. Encyclopedia Britannica, Cuba (11th ed. 1911), available at http:/
71.191lencyclopedia.org/C/CU/CUBA.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2003).
83. MORENO & MORENO, supra note 35, at 137.
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Starting in 1902, the pace of immigration to Cuba expanded
exponentially. More than 1,000,000 new settlers arrived in Cuba
during the next three decades.84 Of these, more than 730,000
came from Spain, while 60,000 came from the United States.85
Most of the immigrants were-like Angel Castro and Manuel
Fraga-single young men.8"
During the economic downturn of the 1930s and the collapse
of the world-wide sugar market,87 Cuba changed from a country of
immigration to one of emigration. Many of the Spanish settlers
returned to Spain,88 while 35,000 Cubans emigrated to the United
States between 1930 and 1950.11
IV. MIGRATION AND REVOLUTIONARY CUBA
During the mid 20th century, Fidel Castro, after training in
Mexico and with the financial backing of Cubans living in Florida
and New York,90 launched a rebellion against the corrupt Cuban
government of Fulgencio Batista. Ultimately, Batista fled in Jan-
uary 1959, 91 and Castro came to power. Castro's new government
enacted fundamental economic and social reforms, which included
nationalization of banks, industries and agricultural holdings.
During 1959, the year that the revolutionaries led by Fidel
Castro assumed power, Cuba experienced significant immigration
as political exiles returned, and emigration as those fearing the
new Cuban government departed. Beginning in 1960, the migra-
tory flows were generally outward, punctuated and triggered by
high profile political events. The majority of those who left went
to the nearby United States where they formed sizeable Cuban
communities that, over time, developed substantial political
power.2" Not surprisingly, given the common language, the long-
84. An Old Phenomenon, supra note 36, at 2. See also DE LIMA DAN'rAs, supra
note 4, at 24 (stating that Cuban economic development attracted 10,000 Spanish
immigrants by 1906).
85. An Old Phenomenon, supra note 36, Table 2. In addition, roughly 325,000
came from the Caribbean, particularly from Jamaica, Haiti, and Puerto Rico, while
10,000 came from China, mostly via the United States. Id.
86. More than 80% were men, more than 90% were between 15 and 45 years old
and more than 70% were single. Id. at 3.
87. Id. See also DE LIMA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 26, 29.
88. An Old Phenomenon, supra note 36, at 3.
89. Id.
90. DE LIMA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 37.
91. Id. at 38. Fulgencio Batista, an army sergeant who took power in the 1930s,
ruled on and off until he fled in the face of Castro's forces on Jan. 1, 1959. Id.
92. BACH, supra note 71, at 82-83.
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standing ties between the colony and the mother country, and the
sizeable twentieth century emigration from Spain, many Cubans
also moved to Spain.
Cuban sources report that 900,000 Cubans emigrated legally
during the first four decades of the Revolution." Of these, close to
40,000 Cubans currently live in Europe, mostly in Spain.94
Approximately 130,000 Cubans currently live in Latin American
countries, while most of the others reside in the United States. 5
Cuban sources also report a large number who emigrated illegally
during those years.96
The Cuban emigration policies and the Spanish and United
States immigration policies have changed substantially over the
past four decades. These policies have evolved in a highly interac-
tive manner. As just one example, the lack of Cuban exit restric-
tions in the early 1960s, together with the liberal admission of
Cuban asylum seekers into the United States, encouraged
Spain-at the time a poor country that exported workers to Ger-
many and Switzerland97 - to provide a generous welcome to
Cubans seeking shelter. In analyzing the movement of people
from Cuba during the last 40 years, it is clear that the United
States, bound to Cuba by geography and pushed away by ideology,
played the leading role. On more than one occasion, Castro
announced that Cubans with relatives in the United States could
leave, an offer not extended to those whose families lived in Spain
or elsewhere. Nonetheless, although Spain's actions have had a
less momentous impact on the late twentieth century Cuban dias-
pora, they have played a significant part in this epic tale. Indeed,
93. Rolando Garcia-Quinones, International Migrations in Cuba: Persisting
Trends and Changes, Cuban Emigration: Ways and Means 1, Sistema Econ6mico
Latinoamericano (2002), available at http:/flanic.utexas.edu/-sela/AA2K2/ENG/docs/
Coop/migraspsmirdil2-02/spsmirdil2-3.htm (last visited May 29, 2003) [hereinafter
Cuban Emigration: Ways and Means].
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id. Most reports in the United States indicate that more than 1,000,000
Cubans arrived in the U.S. between 1959 and 1995. See, e.g., FELIX ROBERTO MASUD
PILOTO, WITH OPEN ARMS: CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 1 (1988).
96. Illegal emigration is always harder to quantify. Cuban sources report roughly
90,000 illegal emigrants between 1985 and 2000. Id.
97. Nearly 100,000 Spaniards emigrated annually as guest workers to other
countries in Europe during the 1960s. Ortega Perez, supra note 35, at 1.
98. For example, on September 28, 1965, Castro announced that all Cubans with
relatives in the United States could leave Cuba if their relatives invited them to the
United States. MASuD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 57. See also Fidel Castro, Speech
Marking Fifth Anniversary of CDR (Sept. 29, 1965), available at http://lanic.utexas.
edu/la/cblcuba !castro /1965/19650929.
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each of the successive Spanish governments, from Franco's
National Movement to the current-day Popular Party, has made a
special place for Cubans in Spain. Viewing Spain's evolving reac-
tions to Cubans who rejected Castro's revolution, while noting the
impact of contemporaneous political events in Cuba and the
United States, sheds light on how Cuban exceptionalism devel-
oped in Spain. It also reveals how both Spain and the United
States avoided viewing Cubans through the prism of international
law until they decided that adopting international refugee stan-
dards would help them stop the migratory patterns they had
encouraged for many years.
A. The Franco Era
1. The Anti-Communist Heritage
Spanish policy toward revolutionary Cuba must be seen in the
context of Spain's long historical ties to Cuba and its tumultuous
encounter with communism in the 20th century. In Spain, as in
the United States, antipathy to Marxist-Leninist ideology was a
hallmark of the second half of the 20th century. The Spanish gov-
ernment's hostility to communism had its roots in the devastating
Civil War that engulfed Spain from 1936 to 1939. Extremist rhet-
oric characterized the bitterly fought election campaign in 1936.
Spaniards were warned that votes for the left-wing Popular Front
coalition would result in red flags flying over Spain.99 On election
day, the Popular Front officials barely edged out the rightist
National Front in the popular vote,'0 0 but the electoral system
ensured that the Popular Front emerged with close to two-thirds
of the seats in the parliament. 1 1 The Socialists, who had won
eighty-eight seats, 102 refused to participate in the "bourgeois" gov-
ernment, which led to a minority Left Republican government
that became increasingly ineffectual.0 3 Mass strikes by Socialists
and anarchist groups and revolutionary land seizures led to grave
concern by conservatives and by many military leaders. As
strikes, arson, and political assassinations mounted in the spring
99. HUGH THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 155-56 (Penguin Books 1977) (1961).
100. Roughly 73% of the voters went to the polls in the 1936 elections. The Popular
Front received 34.3%, the Nationalist Front received 33.2%, and the center group
received 5.4%. Id.; PAYNE, supra note 28, at 44.
101. Due to the electoral list system, the leftist parties won nearly 2/3 of the seats
in the parliament. THOMAS, supra note 99, at 156; PAYNE, supra note 28, at 44-45.
102. THOMAS, supra note 99, at 156.
103. PAYNE, supra note 28, at 45.
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and early summer of 1936,"04 rumors circulated of a communist
plot to seize power during July 1936.05 Fears of a communist
coup, among other factors, led a small group of military officers to
rebel against the Popular Front government on July 18, 1936,
triggering the Spanish Civil War." 6
During the war, the nationalist forces, led by Francisco
Franco, identified themselves as the "true Spain" and denounced
their opponents as "anti-Spain" and the forces of the "Red ter-
ror."10 7 After the nationalists won in 1939, Franco maintained
martial law for the next decade'018 and there was absolutely no talk
of reconciliation.19 The victors executed approximately 30,000
political opponents"' and imprisoned close to 300,000."' The laws
were rewritten in 1939, and made retroactive to 1934, in order to
penalize all political activity and aid that had been given to the
Republican war effort, including "grave passivity" during the
war."' Mere membership in left-liberal political parties, as well
104. Id. at 45, 97. The leader of the rightist coalition in parliament, Calvo Sotelo,
was arrested by the Left Republican police and murdered on July 13, 1936. This
execution conveyed that a leftist revolutionary movement that did not tolerate
political dissent had taken control in Spain. Id.
105. Id. at 97. No evidence of a specific leftist plot to take control in July 1936 has
ever been established. Id.
106. Id. at 100. Historians note that although there was rebellious activity in 44 of
the 51 Spanish army posts, the core of the military rebellion probably numbered fewer
than 1000 army officers. Id.
107. Id. at 220.
108. The army rebels had promptly formed a military council, Junta de Defensa
Nacional, and had declared martial law on July 28, 1936. Franco did not repeal
martial law until April 7, 1948. Id. at 221.
109. Indeed, Franco used religious terms to justify imposing forced labor on his
political opponents rather than seeking reconciliation with them:
It is necessary to liquidate the hatred and passions left by our past
war. But this liquidation must not be accomplished in the liberal
manner, with enormous and disastrous amnesties, which are a
deception rather than a gesture of forgiveness. It must be
Christian, achieved by means of redemption through work
accompanied by repentance and penitence.
Id. at 224, quoting Franco, cited in MAx GA.LLO, HISTOIRE DE L'EsPAGNE FRANQUISTE
1:102 (1969),
110. The statistics are fuzzy. There were frequent allegations that Franco's forces
had executed 200,000. Many historians believe that number is inflated, with a more
accurate estimate being 28,000-30,000. Id. at 216-20.
111. There seems to be more agreement about the numbers imprisoned. When the
war ended on April 1, 1939, the prison population was 100,292. By the end of
December 1939, the population in prison had swelled to 270,719. At the end of
December 1940, 233,373 were in prison. Id. at 222-23.
112. The Law of Political Responsibilities of February 9, 1939, was retroactive to
October 1, 1934. Id. at 221.
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as in revolutionary groups, was criminalized."3 In 1940 Franco
promulgated a new law outlawing communism, defined to include
Trotskyists, anarchists, and other similar elements, as well as
members of the Communist Party."4 A year after the war ended,
the prison population was still over 230,000.11 Franco's regime
was notorious for "constant, regular, and methodical" repres-
sion." 6 Gradually, the prison population grew smaller."7 The
repression continued, but death sentences and long prison terms
diminished. '18
2. The Policy Toward Cuban Refugees
Throughout his forty years of rule,"9 Franco's dictatorship
was known for both its anti-communism and its isolationism. The
Communist Party and the Socialist Party remained outlawed in
Spain.' 2' There was no talk of rapprochement with the Soviet
Union,' 2 ' the People's Republic of China,'22 or the eastern Euro-
pean countries under communist rule. 2 ' This was the setting
when the leftist revolutionary forces chased the military dictator
from Cuba in 1959.
Furthermore, under Franco, who ruled dictatorially from
1939 to 1975, there was no Spanish law on immigration or on asy-
lum. 24 Decisions on entry and residence in Spain were essentially
113. Id. at 222.
114. The Law for the Suppression of Masonry and Communism of March 1, 1940.
Id. at 225.
115. Id.at 223 (Table 11.2).
116. Id. at 223, quoting JOSEP MARIA SOLE I SABATER, LA REPREssIo FRANQUISTA A
CATALUNYA 268 (1985).
117. 40,000 political prisoners were freed on the second anniversary of Franco's
victory. During the fall of 1941, Franco released 20,000 more prisoners. The
following winter he released 50,000 political prisoners, with another 50,000 released
in December 1943. Id. at 226-27.
118. Id. at 226-28.
119. Franco died on November 20, 1975. Francisco Franco, Encyclopedia
Britannica Online (2003), available at http://www.search.eb.com/ebi/article?
eu=296306.
120. Only in February 1977 did the Socialist Party again become a legal
organization. The Communist Party was legalized in April 1977. HOOPER, supra note
60, at 36.
121. Spain severed diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. when Franco came to
power in 1939, and only re-established diplomatic relations on 2/10/77 after Franco
died.
122. Shortly before Franco died, Spain established diplomatic relations with the
P.R.C. on 3/9/73.
123. Spain established diplomatic relations with Hungary and Czechoslovakia on 2/
10/77 and with East Germany on 1/11/73.
124. SANTOLAYA MACHETL, supra note 9, at 54. The first Spanish legislation
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administrative, and were completely discretionary.'25 Refugees
from Cuba who arrived in Spain after Castro came to power,
therefore, faced a legal vacuum. Those who had retained their
Spanish citizenship could, of course, enter Spain. Those who
lacked Spanish citizenship did not have the right to enter Spain,
but as they were fleeing a communist revolution in a former Span-
ish colony, they had reason to hope the anti-communist Spanish
regime would give them shelter, which Franco did. He presided
over a major reverse migration. Many of the thousands of
Spaniards who had emigrated to Cuba before 1959 found them-
selves and their families returning to Spain after Castro's revolu-
tion took power.
12 6
In this discretionary admission system, Spain had no legisla-
tion or regulation distinguishing refugees from other migrants.
There was no procedure to determine whether a Cuban, or anyone
else, was fleeing from persecution, from difficult economic circum-
stances, from personal crises, or was not fleeing at all. Not sur-
prisingly, there was also an absence of public information
concerning those who had been admitted to Spain. This makes
quantitative conclusions less than reliable. Nonetheless, it is
clear that Cubans began to arrive in Spain soon after the Cuban
Revolution.
A look at the situation in Cuba at that time indicates that
relatively wealthy landowners and members of the professional
and managerial classes were among the first Cubans to arrive in
addressing refugees and asylum, Ley 5/1984, de 26 de marzo de 1984, reguladora del
derecho de asilo y de la condici6n de refugiado, Boletin Oficial del Estado, #74, de 27
de marzo 1984 [Act 511984 of March 26, 1984 Regulating the Right of Asylum and
Refugee Status, published in the Official State Gazette, #74, Mar. 27, 19841, was
enacted in 1984. This law has since been modified by Ley 911994 de 19 de mayo,
Boletin Oficial del Estado, # 122, de 23 de mayo 1994. Before any refugee legislation
had been enacted, the Spanish Ministry of Interior had issued an order guaranteeing
protection to those in Spain who had already been deemed refugees by the United
Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). Orden de Ministerio del Interior
de 16 de mayo, Boletin Oficial del Estado #124, de 24 de mayo 1979. The first Spanish
legislation addressing immigration, Ley Orgdnica 711985, sobre derechos y libertades
de los extranjeros en Espana, Boletin Oficial del Estado, de 3 de julio 1985 [Organic
Law 711985 Concerning the Rights and Liberties of Aliens in Spain], was enacted in
1985. Id. The Law on Aliens was amended twice in 2000, Ley Orgdnica 4/2000, de 11
de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en Espafia y su integraci6n
social, en su redacci6n dada por la Ley Orgdnica 812000, de 22 de diciembre 2000,
Boletin Oficial del Estado, de 23 de diciembre 2000.
125. Interview with Pablo Santolaya Machetti, Professor of Constitutional Law,
Complutense University, Madrid, Spain (May 14, 2002) (transcript of interview on file
with author).
126. MARTIN FERNANDEZ & ROMAN, supra note 64, at 23.
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Spain in 1959 and 1960. The basic land reform legislation of
1959,127 followed by a trade agreement between Cuba and the
Soviet Union,128 the expropriation of British and U.S.-owned refin-
eries that refused to process Soviet crude oil in Cuba,'29 the U.S.
suspension of the sugar quota allocated to Cuba,'3 and the seizure
of U.S.-owned property in Cuba'3' established a spiral of hostility
threatening those in business. There were also executions of some
political opponents, imprisonment of others, and efforts to limit
civil liberties. 32 Many who felt endangered or unsettled by these
events must have wanted to leave Cuba, and if they had money or
other resources, they could. At the beginning of the Castro gov-
ernment, emigration remained, as it had been under Batista,
essentially uncontrolled."3
In terms of the economic situation in Spain, the timing of the
first Cubans to arrive after the revolution was propitious. In the
1960s, Spain was entering a decade of intense development and
these first Cuban emigrants tended to be businessmen, property
owners and entrepreneurs." They brought timely skills and
knowledge. Moreover, the building boom beginning to transform
Spain into a mass tourist destination also provided work for
Cubans who lacked professional or technical training.13
Without a doubt, however, the majority of the Cubans who
entered Spain planned to remain only temporarily.'36 They saw
Spain as a way station for a few months while they satisfied the
legal formalities and obtained visas for the United States."7 By
127. The land reform law was enacted on May 17, 1959. DE LIMA DANTAS, supra
note 4, at 40.
128. On February 15, 1960 there was a Joint Communique on Soviet-Cuban
Commercial Agreement. Id. at 42.
129. BENDER, supra note 25, at 21. See also ANDRES SUAREZ, CUBA: CASTROISM AND
COMMUNISM, 1959-1966 93 (1967).
130. This was the remainder of the sugar quota for the year; it amounted to more
than 90 million dollars. DE LIMA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 40; see also SuAREz, supra
note 129, at 93 (arguing that Eisenhower reduced the Cuban sugar quota in
retaliation for the confiscation of American oil refineries).
131. DE LIMA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 40; SUAREZ, supra note 129, at 97.
132. DE LIMA DANTAS, supra note 4, at 42.
133. BENDER, supra note 25, at 117. In 1959 and 1960, the Cuban government
imposed few restrictions on citizens who wished to leave. From 1961 to 1963,
departure from Cuba continued to be legal, but those emigrating had to abandon all
their possessions. Emigration was unrestricted under Batista until the first year of
the Revolution. Id. at 117-18; see also BACH, supra note 71, at 82.
134. MARTIN FERNANDEZ & ROMAN, supra note 64, at 23-24.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Id. at 24-25.
137. Id. at 24-25.
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and large, the Cubans in Spain did complete the necessary
processing and move to the United States.'38 In fact, during the
early 1960s many Cubans managed to finish this process very
quickly, in only two or three months.'39 While they were in Spain,
the Cuban exiles received assistance from the Spanish govern-
ment and charitable organizations. 4 ' They were provided food,
clothing, shelter, medical assistance, English classes, and support
for traveling to the United States or any other country that wel-
comed the Cubans.
1 4 1
During the beginning of the 1960s, Cubans could immigrate
to the United States relatively easily.' Neither the United States
government nor those arriving in the United States viewed the
Cubans as immigrants, people who were moving permanently to
the United States. The situation appeared fragile and temporary,
and there was precedent allowing Cuban political exiles, those
who dissented from the regime in power, to live in the United
States until the situation improved. As a result, the United
States government adopted a temporary solution to allow Cubans
legal entry and residence by relying on the parole power of the
general immigration law,"4 a mechanism that had been used in
138. Id. at 24. In 1959 and 1960, Cubans who satisfied the U.S. immigration laws
could apply for visas in the U.S. embassy in Havana. Once the U.S. broke diplomatic
relations with Cuba in January 1961, however, the U.S. embassy ceased to operate
and immigrant visas to the U.S. could only be obtained in U.S. embassies in other
countries, such as Spain. MASUD PILOTO, supra note 95, at 34. The U.S. later decided
to waive the visa requirement for those seeking to migrate from "communist
oppression" in Cuba to the U.S. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Although the United States immigration laws throughout much of the 19th
century were welcoming, the national origin laws of the 1920s introduced drastic
limitations on immigration, both numerically and by nationality, in addition to the
prohibitions added earlier against undesirable groups such as criminals, prostitutes,
polygamists, anarchists, vagrants, and those with contagious diseases. Cuban
immigrants, however, faced no numerical or nationality-based restrictions because
the quota laws did not apply to citizens of independent nations in the Western
Hemisphere. This was the legislation in place in 1959 and in the early 1960s, when
many Cubans came to the United States after Batista fled and Castro took over. For a
more detailed account of the development of U.S. immigration law, see U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION (1980).
Although Cubans did not face numerical limitations on immigration to the United
States, they did need to satisfy the requirements for obtaining immigration visas,
which were available to those who did not fall into the disfavored categories and who
possessed certain employment skills or whose close relatives lived in the U.S. See
ELIZABETH J. HARPER, IMMIGRATION LAws OF THE UNITED STATES 5-30 (3rd ed. 1975)
(summarizing immigration requirements in effect in 1959-1960).
143. 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5). The text of the parole provision has been changed
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prior circumstances to admit refugees. For example, the Attorney
General had paroled more than 30,000 Hungarian refugees into
the United States in 1957, after the Soviets had crushed the Hun-
garian Revolution.'"
In relying on the Attorney General's decision to parole
Cubans into the country, the United States, like Spain, utilized
executive discretion to respond to the sudden migration from
Cuba.'45 Similarly, the United States, like Spain, did not examine
whether the Cubans qualified as refugees. The text of the parole
provision makes no reference to refugees, persecution, or asylum.
Therefore, unlike other groups seeking refuge in the United
States, those admitted via the parole process do not have to prove
that they have a well-founded fear of persecution based on politi-
cal, religious, racial, or similar grounds.' 46 Accordingly, the
Cubans allowed to enter the United States as "parolees" were, and
continue to be, privileged in comparison with all others seeking
slightly since the 1960s, but the content remains the same: "The Attorney General
may in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions
as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public
interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such
alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of
such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien
shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States."
144. Approximately 32,000 Hungarians were paroled into the United States, and
6,000 Hungarians were admitted under the short-lived Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Act
of Aug. 7, 1953, 67 Stat. 400. See generally, RiCHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY LAW (3rd ed., Carolina Academic Press, 2000). In 1958 Congress
enacted legislation granting permanent legal status to Hungarian refugees who had
been admitted via the parol power. Act of July 25, 1958, Public Law 85-559, 72 Stat.
419, 8 U.S.C. §1182. Later the U.S. used the same provision to admit 130,000
Vietnamese refugees in 1975. See CAROL DALGLISH, REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM 1
(1989). See also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 1000 (4th ed. 1998).
145. The statutory authorization for parole embodies a legislative decision to allow
the executive to use almost unlimited discretion. The legislative standards for the use
of this discretion are quintessentially indeterminate: "for emergent reasons" or "in the
public interest." See supra note 143 and accompanying text. In 1996 Congress
replaced these terms with "case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5)(A)(2000). It is debatable as to
whether the new legislative standards significantly narrow the extent of discretion
that the executive branch can exercise. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 144, at
510.
146. The standard for those seeking admission to the U.S. as refugees or asylees
requires that the applicant demonstrate Apersecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C.§1101(a)(42)(2000). See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1)(2003).
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shelter in America. Through this preferential admission policy,
more than 200,000 Cubans, many of whom were from the profes-
sional and upper classes,147 arrived in the United States from 1959
through 1962.'
After the Cuban Missile crisis in late 1962, Cuba limited the
transportation available for legal departures, which drastically
curtailed the numbers of emigrants. " ' However, in the second
half of the 1960s, the rhetoric became more muted and Cuba
allowed large numbers of its nationals to leave.'-" Not coinciden-
tally, increasing numbers of Cubans began arriving in Spain.
There were 2,648 Cubans admitted in 1964.5 The number more
than doubled in 1965 to 6,431,"2 and swelled to 8,904 in 1968.'11
The numbers continued to grow in the late 1960s and early 1970s
when the annual arrivals from Cuba exceeded 12,000, which was
more than five times the number of those who had come to Spain
in 1964.114 These Cubans, popularly referred to as refugees by
Spaniards even though their motives for leaving Cuba had not
147. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 95, describes Cubans arriving in 1959 and 1960 as
rich and those arriving in 1961 as professionals and technicians. Id. at 58, 33-34, 51-
52; TRAviaso-DLAZ, supra note 25, at 240; Miguel Gonzlez-Pando, Development
Stages of the "Cuban Exile Country" (Cuba in Transition: Volume 7-Papers and
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the
Cuban Economy), 1997, at 51, available at http:I/lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cubalasce/
cuba7/gzlezpan.pdf.
148. The statistics are sometimes reported by calendar year and sometimes by
fiscal year (beginning July 1 and ending June 30). MASuD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 3,
Table 1.1. Using fiscal year for 1960 and later, reports the following arrivals by year:
26,527 in the first half of 1959, 60,224 in 1960, 49,961 in 1961, 78,611 in 1962. Id.
RIvERA, supra note 25, at 2, reports that 120,000 Cubans had arrived in the United
States in 1959 and 1960, followed by 155,000 more in 1961 and 1962. The U.S.
severed diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961. Cuba, Country Study, supra
note 4, at 44.
149. Between November 1962 and November 1965, 29,962 Cuban refugees entered
the U.S. BENDER, supra note 25, at 118. During these years the Cuban government,
although not outlawing it, characterized emigration as "the abandonment of the
homeland" or "immigration without return." Rolando Garcia-Quinones, International
Migrations in Cuba: Persisting Trends and Changes, International Migrations From
1959 (Sistema Econ6mico Latinoamericano) (2002), available at http://lanic.utexas.
edu/-sela/AA2K2/ENG/docs/Coop/migra/spsmirdil2-02/spsmirdil2-2.htm
[hereinafter International Migrations From 19591.
150. Id. These were the years of the vuelos de la libertad, or freedom flights, which
brought approximately 50,000 Cubans per year to the U.S. Infra notes 157-162 and
accompanying text.
151. Martin-Fernandez & Romano, supra note 64, at 24-25.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The following numbers show the increase of Cuban arrivals in Spain each
year: 6,679 in 1966, 7,954 in 1967, 8,904 in 1968, 7,012 in 1969, 11,089 in 1970,
13,332 in 1971, 12,038 in 1972. Id.
552 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3
been scrutinized in any government proceeding, totaled nearly
80,000 between 1964 and 1972.
With the upsurge of Cuban arrivals in the mid-1960s, the
Spanish government established a Refugee Social Services pro-
gram, which took responsibility for assisting needy Cubans who
entered Spain.'5 5 The increase in Cubans arriving in Spain coin-
cided with an increase in the time it took to satisfy the require-
ments to enter the United States." 6
Several significant events occurred in the middle of the dec-
ade that had an impact on the admission of Cubans into the
United States. In 1965, Castro announced that all those who
wanted to leave Cuba to join their families in the United States
could leave from the port of Camarioca. 1"7 In a preview of the 1980
Mariel boatlift, thousands hastily made their way to the port city,
and more than 5,000 succeeded in buying, renting, or stealing
boats, while others waited for family members to arrive from Flor-
ida to take them out of Cuba. 15 1 In an effort to create a more
orderly avenue of migration, Cuba and the United States agreed
on a series of ten weekly flights to the United States."9 Soon,
roughly 4,000 Cubans began arriving in the United States each
month."6 ' Flying 50,000 Cubans to Florida each year and integrat-
155. Id. at 24.
156. Id. at 25. The change in U.S. immigration law in 1965 treated Cubans seeking
to enter the U.S. from Spain as part of the immigrant quota for the western
hemisphere, as opposed to merely paroling them into the U.S. Cubans coming
directly to the U.S. from Cuba were not part of this quota. The labor certification
requirement of the U.S. immigration law also posed additional difficulties for Cubans
seeking to move to the U.S. from Spain. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
157. BENDER, supra note 25, at 119. Castro announced this on September 28, 1965.
See Fidel Castro, Speech Marking Fifth Anniversary of CDR, (Sept. 29, 1965),
(transcript available at http: / /lanic.utexas.edu /la /cb I cuba/castro /1965/19650929).
158. TRAVIESo-DiAz, supra note 25, at 241. Hundreds of boats arrived in Camarioca
from the U.S. in October 1965, but it was hurricane season and the private boatlift
was soon cancelled in favor of weekly air flights after only 5,000 of 200,000 Cubans
managed to leave. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 61. Although Castro's
announcement specified Cubans could leave Camarioca for the United States and
most of the Cubans who left headed directly to the United States, there was a
simultaneous increase in the number of Cubans arriving in Spain. See supra notes
151-154 and accompanying text.
159. BENDER, supra note 25, at 117. The U.S. and Cuba agreed in a Memorandum
of Understanding that Cuban nationals with immediate relatives in the United States
would be given priority on the flights. Silvia Pedraza, Cuba's Refugees: Manifold
Migrations, (Assoc. for the Study of the Cuban Economy) (1995) at 315, available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/lacb/cuba/asce/cuba5/FILE26.PDF [hereinafter Manifold
Migrations]. The airfare was $800 per passenger.
160. The Cuban authorities required those who wished to join this exodus to
register in Cuba; close to 300,000 applied before the registration period expired in
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ing the new arrivals proved an expensive and politically contro-
versial task, 6' but the United States did not waver in providing a
home to all Cubans who wanted to leave their country. Although
the United States continued to employ the general immigration
laws to manage the migration from Cuba, President Johnson
employed the rhetoric of refugee protection: "I declare this after-
noon to the people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here in
America will find it. The dedication of America to our tradition as
an asylum for the oppressed is going to be upheld." 6 '
Furthermore, as Fidel Castro remained in power and large
numbers continued to flee, the lawful but temporary status of
Cubans paroled into the United States became less satisfactory.1
With the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966,164 Congress regularized
the situation by providing that all Cubans paroled into the United
States could become permanent residents of the United States
after two years in the United States.'65 This act was another bene-
fit awarded exclusively to Cuban nationals. As a result, any
May 1966. The United States reviewed those who had registered to determine who
were eligible to come to the U.S. Id. Although the Cuban government allowed
hundreds of thousands to register, it prohibited certain groups from emigrating:
professionals, technical workers, skilled workers, and young men of military age.
Manifold Migrations, supra note 159, at 315-316. The annual arrivals of Cubans in
the United States via these flights follow: 46,688 in 1966; 52,147 in 1967; 55,945 in
1968; 52,625 in 1969; 49,545 in 1970; 50,001 in 1971, and 23,977 in 1972, the year
that Castro halted the flights. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 3, Table 1.1.
161. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 61-68. The Cuban Refugee Program
established by the President John Kennedy assisted more than 700,000 Cubans
between 1961 and 1976 at a cost that exceeded $1,000,000,000. Id. at 48-54. Many in
Florida were concerned that an enormous increase in arrivals from Cuba would be
burdensome on state and local agencies and would escalate racial tensions in urban
areas within the state. Id. at 62-64.
162. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty
Island, New York, Entry No. 546, (Oct.3, 1965), in Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson 1037-1040 (U.S. Government Printing Office
ed., 1966), (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.
horn / speeches.hom 1651003.asp.
163. U.S. immigration law admits immigrants, who plan to reside permanently in
the U.S., and nonimmigrants, who plan to reside temporarily in order to accomplish a
specific goal. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 144, at 273. The Cubans had not
been formally admitted as immigrants, with the right of permanent residence, and
the Attorney General, who had admitted them under the parole authority, see supra
note 143 and accompanying text, could revoke their permission to remain in the
United States at any time. Id. at 507-509.
164. Cuban Refugees: Adjustment of Status, Pub. L. 89-732, 80 Stat 1161 (1966),
amended by Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2706 (1976) & Pub. L. No. 96-212, §203(i), 94
Stat. 108 (1980), (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255).
165. The requirement of two years of physical presence has since been reduced to
one year. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 144, at 1173.
554 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3
Cuban who could reach the United States - or reach the U.S.
ships patrolling the seas just outside Cuba's twelve mile territo-
rial limits 16 6- could enter the United States legally and become a
lawful permanent resident within two years,'67 even becoming a
U.S. citizen within five more years."" There was no need to show
family ties, employment skills, or any factor other than being
Cuban. Again, the United States government,6 9 while often refer-
ring to the Cubans as refugees, opted not to apply the recently
adopted refugee legal standard to them.17° Again, no other coun-
try's nationals had it so easy
In addition, the United States enacted a thorough overhaul of
the general immigration legislation in 1965.11 As a consequence,
Cubans seeking admission to the United States from Spain
became subject to the immigration procedure rather than the
parole process.'72 Moreover, the new immigration law created a
lengthy procedure for those seeking to enter the United States
based on an offer of employment."
All these measures had a significant impact on the Cubans
waiting in Spain. Although generally successful in entering the
United States, the average Cuban now spent more than a year in
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
168. 8 U.S.C, §1427(a)(1)( 1 9 94) (5 year residence requirement for lawful permanent
residents seeking citizenship).
169. The earlier decision, to parole Cubans into the U.S., had been made by the
executive branch. The preferential treatment afforded by the Cuban Adjustment Act
was a decision made by the legislative branch. See supra note 145.
170. In the Immigration and Nationality Act - Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1994)),
Congress had provided that 6% of the annual admissions of immigrants born outside
the Western Hemisphere would be available to refugees, defined as those who
"because of persecution or fear of persecution based on race, religion, or political
opinion ... have fled any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area or
from any country within the general area of the Middle East. . . ." [formerly 8 U.S.C.
§153(a)(7)]. See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text. This provision was
amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2000)), which removed the reference to communist
countries and the Middle East and added fear of persecution based on nationality and
social group. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42).
171. Immigration and Nationality Act - Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1994)).
172. MARTIN-FERNANDEZ & RoMANo, supra note 64, at 24-25.
173. The 1965 legislation required all applicants for visas based on employment, as
opposed to family reunification, to comply with the labor certification process to
ensure that they will not take jobs from U.S. workers or depress the prevailing wage.
8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(14). This procedure has since been modified by the Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009, (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2000).
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Spain before making arrangements to leave for the United
States.7 4 By 1972 there were 25,000 Cubans in Spain waiting to
arrange their visas and travel plans to the United States.'75 This
backlog slowly diminished,'76 and most of the Cubans left Spain by
the end of the decade.
177
3. The Diplomatic Policy Toward Cuba
In light of Franco's anti-communism, granting refuge to those
fleeing Cuba's communist revolution may not have been surpris-
ing. What is unexpected, however, at least to most Americans, is
Spain's unbroken connections with Cuba. As Castro transformed
the former Spanish colony into a communist society, Spain did not
sever diplomatic relations with Cuba. Franco, himself a Galician
like Castro and Fraga, as well as 150,000 residents of Cuba in
1959,178 continued to maintain formal, political, and commercial
ties with Cuba."9
When the United States recalled its ambassador and severed
its diplomatic ties with Cuba in 1961,18 Spain maintained diplo-
matic silence.' When Castro proclaimed himself a "Marxist-Len-
inist" in December 1961, Spain observed from the sidelines. When
the Organization of American States (OAS) excluded Cuba from
174. MARTIN-FERNANDEZ & RoMANo, supra note 64, at 25.
175. Id. at 26.
176. There appear to be no reliable statistics showing which Cubans actually left
Spain, but the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami recorded approximately 20,000
Cubans who arrived in Florida from Spain between 1973 and 1978. Id.
177. Id.
178. Castro Visits His Father's Spanish Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at A3.
179. GABRIEL A. ONDE2"rI, Western European and Canadian Relations with Cuba
after the Cold War, in 9 Cuba Briefing Paper Series. (Nov. 1995) available at http://
www.trinitydc.edu/academics/depts/Interdisc/International/caribbean%20briefings/
WesternEuropean.pdf (last visited June 5, 2003); see also JOAQUIN Roy, Espaha y
Cuba: Una Relaci6n Muy Especial?, Revista CIDOB d=Afers Internacionals, Issue
no. 31 (1996) available at http://www.cidob.org/castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/roy.
html.
180. The U.S. recognized the new government of Cuba in January 1959, only one
week after Batista fled. The U.S. broke diplomatic relations with Cuba two years
later in January 1961. Cuba, Country Study, supra note 4, at 44.
181. There was a diplomatic contretemps in 1960 when the Spanish ambassador to
Cuba from 1952-1960 interrupted Castro's live television criticisms of the Spanish
embassy's activities with the Catholic Church in Cuba. Castro ordered the
ambassador to leave Cuba within 24 hours. Telemundo Pregunta: Guest Dr. Fidel
Castro (TELEMUNDO television broadcast, Jan. 20, 1960) (transcript available at http:/
www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1960/196001200). When the ambassador
arrived in Spain, Franco criticized, rather than praised, him for causing the incident.
RoY, supra note 50, at 61. Spain did not send another ambassador, but did not sever
diplomatic ties. PAYNE, supra note 28, at 530-531.
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participating in January 1962,82 Spain merely took note. When
the Federal Republic of Germany cut its ties with Cuba in 1963 to
protest Castro's close relations with the communist government in
East Germany, Spain kept its ambassador in Havana.' When
Venezuela intercepted Cuban arms destined for anti-government
forces and successfully sought OAS sanctions against Cuba in
1964,11 and later called on all nations in the Americas to sever
diplomatic and consular ties with Cuba,' s Spain kept its counsel.
When the OAS issued a general call to "western" allies to restrict
trade to Cuba, Spain ignored the message.
Indeed, the Franco regime permitted commerce and tourism
between Spain and Cuba to continue. As other European coun-
tries distanced themselves politically and economically from Cas-
tro's regime, Spain's right-wing government remained Cuba's
most important trading partner.1 6 Despite the tensions of the
Cuban Missile Crisis in late 1962, Spanish commercial ties with
Cuba proceeded normally in 1963.187 The national airline, Iberia,
continued to schedule direct flights between Havana and
Madrid.""
None of these responses might have been surprising by any
other European country, but no other European government was
as staunchly anti-communist as Franco's.5 s Castro, in turn,
expressed appreciation of the Spanish dictator: "Franco displayed
great patience, infinite patience, with [Cuba]... Also, when the
U.S. government wanted Spain to break diplomatic relations with
182. Cuba has not been expelled from the OAS but its government may not vote or
take action within the OAS. Final Act, 8th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc. OEA.Ser.X.12, Resolution VI, at 6 (1962) available at
http:/l/ww.yale.edullawweb/avalonlintdiplinteramlinfaml7.htm.
183. ONDETrI, supra note 179, at 2-3.
184. Final Act, 9th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/
Ser.F/II.9, Resolution I, at 2 (1964) available at httpJ/www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
intdip/interamlintam14.htm
185. Id.
186. ONDEIT, supra note 178, at 2.
187. PAYNE, supra note 28, at 531.
188. Id.
189. The Salazar government in Portugal was also an anti-communist dictatorship
from 1932 to 1975. During the 1960s and 1970s, much of Portugal's attention and
energy were consumed by lengthy anti-colonial wars in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique,
and Angola. Portugal, Encyclopedia Britannica Online at http://www.search.eb.coml
eb/article?eu=108423 (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
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Cuba, Franco refused to do so." 19 When Franco died in 1975,191
most communist leaders shed no tears. '92 Castro ordered three
days of mourning in Cuba. 93
4. The Post-Franco Transition
After Franco's death, Prince Juan Carlos, Franco's hand-
picked successor and the grandson of Alfonso XIII, the last king to
rule Spain,"' was crowned as a constitutional monarch.'95 This
conservative government gingerly took steps to establish democ-
racy in Spain. When the new Spanish Constitution was ratified in
1978, it included a provision recognizing the right of asylum.'96 By
the end of the decade, Spain adopted the major international refu-
gee treaties and their definition of refugees as those who have a
well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or social group.'97 However, legisla-
tion implementing the treaty obligations was still years in the
future. In the interim, the United Nations High Commissioner for
190. ASUNCION MATEo, Fidel Castro, In Depth, TEMPO, June 10, 1991 at 7 available
at http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/199J19910605. See also SANTIAGO
PEREZ-DIAz, Espafta-Cuba: Un Amor Tormentoso, EL PAIs, Dec. 2, 1996 available at
http://www.udel.edu/leipzig/textsliela02l26.htm (last visited June 11, 2003) (stating
that Castro ordered three days of mourning following Franco's death).
191. Franco died on November 20, 1975. Francisco Franco, Encyclopedia
Britannica Online at http://www.search.eb.com/ebi/article?eu=296306 (last visited
Aug. 12, 2003).
192. Rather than eulogize Franco, communist countries denounced Franco, with
the Soviet Union pausing at Franco's death to remember the "innumerable monstrous
crimes" of Spanish fascists. Juan Carlos Installed as King of Spain; Franco Buried,
Facts on File, Nov. 29, 1975.
193. PEREZ-DiAz, supra note 190.
194. Alfonso XIII stepped down after the 1931 elections, in which the anti-
monarchy voters had routed the opposition, in order to prevent a civil war. He left
Spain when the Republic was declared in 1931; he abdicated the throne shortly before
he died in 1941, still in exile. Hooper, supra note 60, at 87-88. Alfonso xII's son, Don
Juan, is the father of Juan Carlos. Id. at 88-89.
195. Juan Carlos was crowned King of Spain on November 22, 1975, two days after
Franco died. Juan Carlos, Encyclopedia Britannica Online at http://www.search.eb.
com/eb/article?eu=45067. (last visited Aug. 12, 2003).
196. "The law shall establish the terms under which citizens from other countries
and stateless persons may enjoy the right of asylum in Spain." CONSTITUCI6N [C.E.]
art. 13.4 (Spain), passed by the Cortes Generales, Oct. 31, 1978, ratified by
referendum, Dec. 7, 1978, sanctioned by King Juan Carlos, Dec. 27, 1978 (B.O.E.,
1978, 311).
197. Geneva Convention, supra note 29; Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. #606 U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter Protocol]. Spain
acceded to both the Geneva Convention and Protocol in 1978. Instrumento de 22 de
julio de 1978, de Adhesijn de Espafia a la Convenci6n sobre el Estatuo de los
Refugiados, hecha en Ginebra el 28 dejulio de 1951, y al Protocolo sobre el Estatuto de
los Refugiados, hecho en Nueva York el 31 de enero de 1967 (B.O.E, 1978, 252).
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Refugees established an office in Spain and made efforts to protect
refugees, including Cubans." 8
B. The Gonzalez Era
The 1980s marked heady change in Spain. In 1982, Felipe
Gonzalez led the Socialist Party to a resounding victory in the
general elections. Only four decades after the prior Socialist gov-
ernment had been overthrown by the Civil War, and only seven
years after the death of Franca, Gonzalez took control of
Parliament."9
Many expected the election of Gonzalez, who visited Cuba in
1979 as the leader of the opposition Socialist Party,"' to herald
warmer relations between Spain and Cuba. 20 1 Gonzalez did make
an official visit to Cuba in 1986202 and successfully pressed for the
release of political prisoners and compensation for nationalized
Spanish-owned property." 3 Furthermore, Castro made his first
198. UNHCR established an office in Spain in 1979. Interview with Maria Angeles
Siemens, Secretary-General, UNHCR Association in Spain, in Madrid, Spain.
Siemens opened the first UNHCR office in Spain, Feb. 5, 2002.
199. Spain's Parliament, the Cortes Generales, consists of two chambers, the
Congreso de los Diputados (Congress of Deputies) and the Senado (Senate). The
Congress of Deputies, which Gonzalez and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista de
Obrero Espanol) [PSOE] controlled with 201 seats out of the total of 350, is the more
important legislative branch. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK
(2003), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sp.html;
Hooper, supra note 60, at 50.
200. Roy, supra note 50, at 83.
201. See generally id. at 81-111.
202. Gonzalez traveled to Cuba in November 1986, after visiting Ecuador and Peru.
Will Ellsworth-Jones, Castro Pins Hope on Gonzalez Visit, TIMEs (London), Nov. 16,
1986; Richard Wigg, Gonzalez Claims Havana Success, TIMEs (London), Nov. 18,
1986. A prior Spanish Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, had visited Cuba in 1978.
Around the World, For the Record, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1978, at A25. Roy, supra
note 50, at 83.
203. Gonazlez sought the release of 26 Spanish prisoners in Cuba, the most
prominent of whom was Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. Gutierrez had been taken to Cuba as
a boy by his father, a prominent Socialist who fled Spain in the waning days of the
Civil War. The son had joined in the fight against Batista and been awarded Cuban
citizenship, but later broke with Castro and was imprisoned. After 21 years in prison,
he was released to Spain shortly after Gonzalez's visit. RoY, supra note 50, at 82-89.
(Recently, Gutierrez Menoyo announced his return to Cuba to support the dissident
community against the current repression. David Gonzalez, Cuba: Exile Figure Says
He's Returned, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at A6.) During the 1986 visit to Cuba,
Gonzalez and Castro agreed that Cuba would pay 40 million dollars in compensation
for nationalized property. This was far less than the 300 million dollars that had been
claimed, but it brought this dispute to an end after a quarter of a century. Roy, supra
note 50, at 89.
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brief unofficial visit to Spain in 1984,204 and returned for a longer
stay in 1992.05 Nonetheless, the Socialist government's attitude
toward Cuba was ambivalent. The Spanish Socialists saw that
the world had changed and were eager to emerge from their isola-
tion beyond the Pyrenees and become part of Europe."' They felt
free to criticize Castro, who, in turn, refused to accept the Spanish
ambassador sent to Cuba."7
In addition to improving, though not perfecting, relations
with Cuba, the Socialist government was extremely active and
reform-minded."' Its many law-making initiatives included mea-
sures regulating the admission of foreigners, including Cubans.
The most important of these was the 1984 legislation on asylum
seekers and refugees, 09 whereby Spain incorporated the interna-
tional refugee definition as a standard by which non-Spaniards
fleeing persecution could enter Spain.210
By this time, the Cuban exodus to Spain had slowed. At the
beginning of the decade, in 1980, the Mariel crisis sent 125,000
204. Castro stopped in Madrid in 1984 on his flight home from the funeral of the
Soviet leader Andropov. Roy, supra note 50, at 85. Nina Darnton, Spain Bolsters
Role in Latin America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1984, at A3.
205. Castro Visits His Father's Spanish Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at A3.
During this visit Castro was feted by Manuel Fraga, the government head of Galicia,
(see supra text accompanying notes 57-63), supra, who was pressing for the release of
Galician political prisoners in Cuba, but ignored by Prime Minister Gonzalez. Id.
206. Roy, supra note 50, at 81-104.
207. Cuba rejected Jos6 Antonio San Gil, the Spanish ambassador, in 1994.
Joaquin Roy, Espahia, la Union Europea y Cuba: la evoluci6n de una relaci6n especial
a una politica de gestos y de presi6n, Cuban Studies Association Occasional Paper
Series, Vol. 1, No. 2, Sept. 15, 1996, at 2. Madrid's Envoy Resigns, SOUTH FLORIDA
SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 1994, at 8A.
208. HOOPER, supra note 60, at 52.
209. Law 5/1984 Regulating the Right of Asylum and Refugee Status, supra note
124.
210. The 1984 legislation distinguished between refugee status and asylum, and
provided that asylum could be granted to many who did not satisfy the refugee
definition under international law. Maria Teresa Gil Bazo, The Role of Spain as a
Gateway to the Schengen Area, 10 INTL. J. REFUGEE LAw 214, 219 (1998); Concepcion
Escobar Hernandez, Asylum and Refugee Status in Spain, 4 INTL. J. OF REFUGEE LAw
57, 66-67 (1992). The 1994 amendment of the refugee law, supra note 124, abolished
this distinction. Gil Bazo, at 220. Refugee legislation was followed by immigration
legislation, Organic Law 7/1985 Concerning the Rights and Liberties of Aliens in
Spain, supra note 124. This statute was passed in preparation for Spain's entry into
the European Community, now called the European Union, which was due to occur in
1986. The legislation's target was foreigners who wanted to enter and work in Spain,
not foreigners already in Spain. Interview with Pablo Santolaya Machetti, supra note
125. The 1985 Law on Aliens was amended twice in 2000 by Organic Law 4/2000 and
Organic Law 8/2000, supra note 124.
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Cubans to the United States 11 and Spain granted residence per-
mits to 7,413 Cubans.212 The numbers were much smaller in the
next few years. 3 In 1984, the year in which the new legislation
took effect, the number of Cubans arriving in Spain decreased to
4,1451 and diminished even further in subsequent years, to 2,551
in 1985, and 1,241 in 1986.215 Thus, by the time Spain moved from
a regime of executive discretion to one of legislative standards
governing the admission of non-citizens, the Cuban Revolution
was more than 25 years old. The major Cuba - Spain migration
was over.
This was not the case in the United States. The United
States had ratified the international refugee treaty in 1967,216 and
Congress passed implementing legislation in 1980.' 7 At that
moment, Cuban emigration policy changed dramatically, when
Castro announced that the port of Mariel was open to all who
chose to go to the United States.21 Within two weeks, 1,000 boats
left from Mariel" s Between April 20th and May 20th alone,
65,000 Cubans departed2. and during the next four months
65,000 more Cubans followed.221 In less than six months, more
211. See notes 218-231 and accompanying text, infra.
212. MARTIN FERNANDEZ & RoMANo, supra note 64, at 26.
213. There were 2,540 residence permits granted to Cubans in 1981, 3,879 in 1982,
and 5,268 in 1983. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. The U.S. ratified the 1967 Protocol, supra note 197, to the Geneva Convention,
supra note 29, but not the Convention itself. By ratifying the Protocol, the U.S.
adopted the refugee definition in Article I.A.(2) of the Convention.
217. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2000)). Under the prior statute, admission to the
United States as a refugee was limited to those fleeing persecution from a communist
country or from the Middle East. The Refugee Act of 1980 removed the ideological
and geographical limitations, offering admission as refugees to those who could show
a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a social group. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42).
218. International Migrations From 1959, supra note 149, at 1. The crisis began in
early April, when a bus of Cuban refugees crashed into the Peruvian Embassy
compound in an attempt to seek asylum. During the next two days, 10,000 Cubans
flooded into the Peruvian embassy in Havana. Close to 700 of the asylum seekers at
the Peruvian embassy were flown to Costa Rica, but this was only the tip of the
iceberg. In face of the large numbers still at the embassy and the unrest, Castro
announced on April 23, 1980 that Cubans could leave for the United States. Id. at 6.
John M. Goshko, State Dept. Seeks to Halt Sealift, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 24, 1980,
at Al.
219. RivERA, supra note 25, at 6.
220. Id.
221. Id.
2004] CUBAN EXCEPTIONALISM 561
than one percent of the Cuban population left the country.222
Although the new statute regulating refugee admissions had
taken effect,22 President Carter decided not to apply the new legal
standard requiring a well-founded fear of persecution to the
Marielitos.224 Instead, he welcomed all Cubans arriving in the
United States, choosing to rely on the parole power to admit them
to the country225 and then allowing them to become lawful perma-
nent residents via the Cuban Adjustment Act.2 As a conse-
quence, the 125,000 Cubans who arrived in a disorganized and
irregular manner in five months in 1980 did not need to satisfy
the asylum standards. So long as they were Cuban, they were
welcome.
2 7
The Mariel migration led to political problems in the United
States. Common criminals, mental patients, and government
agents were included in the boatlift.25 Some committed serious
crimes shortly after they arrived and were incarcerated. 29 Others
rioted in the large camps in Florida and Arkansas where they
were held while the government attempted to devise a plan to
integrate them into the United States.' Although most of the
Cuban emigrants who arrived in 1980 did not present problems,2"'
the Mariel crisis created, for the first time, a negative public
image of the unfettered Cuban migration to the United States.
The United States believed that some of the Cuban criminals
222. Id. at 11.
223. See supra note 218.
224. RrvERA, supra note 25, at 12, 16.
225. The executive proposed a Cuban-Haitian Entrant status, and paroled all
Cubans and Haitians who arrived in the U.S. between June 20, 1980 and October 10,
1980 into the country as "Cuban-Haitian Entrants (status pending)." RIVERA, supra
note 25, at 15. While Cuban-Haitian Entrant status was not legislatively defined (or
codified) in 1980, it was defined for purposes of the Refugee Education Assistance Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, 501(e), 94 Stat. 1799, 1810 (1980) (codified as amended at
8.U.S.C. §1522 note (1982)).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 164-165.
227. For the first time, Haitians who arrived in the U.S. in similar circumstances
as the Cubans received the generous welcome given to Cuban arrivals. RIVERA, supra
note 25, at 15; ALEINIKOFF ET AL, supra note 144, at 509.
228. Manifold Migrations, supra note 159, at 318-319; MASuD-PILOTo, supra note
95, at 85-86, 94-97, 100-101.
229. ALEINIKOFF ET AL, supra note 144, at 509.
230. See Jo Thomas, Troops are Ordered to Arkansas Camp after Refugee Riot, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1980, at Al; Fort Chaffee's Unwanted Cubans, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21,
1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 30; William L. Chaze and Paul Recer, In the Last Days of
Cuban Boatlift, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 16, 1980, at 29; First Anniversary
of Freedom Flotilla, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 21, 1981.
231. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 97.
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imprisoned in the United States were too dangerous to release,
but Castro refused to accept those who had emigrated from
Cuba.232 Desperate to return the unwanted Marielitos, the United
States repeatedly sought diplomatic meetings with Cuban offi-
cials.133 Finally, in 1984, the United States agreed to admit 20,000
Cubans each year, and Cuba agreed to allow the return of 2,746
Cubans who had been jailed in the United States since 1980.234
Although the United States still adhered to a preferential parole
policy for Cubans, for the first time the United States sent
emigrants back to Cuba, a small but significant breach of the
open-door policy.235
C. The Aznar Era
After 14 years in power, the Socialist Party surrendered
power to more conservative politicians in 1996. Jos6 Maria Aznar,
leading the center-right Popular Party, became Prime Minister.3 '
232. ALEINIKOFF ET AL, supra note 144, at 509.
233. Cuba, Country Study, supra note 4, at xxvii, 222.
234. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Feb. 1984, at 44-45. Joint Communique
Between The United States of America and Cuba, Dec. 14, 1984, U.S.-Cuba, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,057. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 100.
235. The new arrangements did not work smoothly; the slow U.S. processing of
Cuban admission applications resulted in far fewer than 20,000 Cuban immigrants
per year. For example, only 2,700 Cubans were granted entry visas to the United
States in 1993-1994, see U.S. Dep't of State, Migration-Cuba (Jan. 1, 2000), available
at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cubalmigration.html [hereinafter
Migration-Cuba], at 2, even though the U.S. visa allotment for Cubans had been
increased to 27,845 in 1990. Id. See also Steven Greenhouse, Flight From Cuba: The
Policy; U.S. Will Propose Reducing Barriers to Cuba Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
1994, at Al. By the summer of 1994, over 19,000 Cubans were waiting in Cuba for
U.S. decisions on their visa applications. Id. See also Tim Golden, Cuban Official
Criticizes Lag by U.S. in Issuing Visas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1994, at A8.
236. In the March 1996 general elections, the Popular Party won 39% of the vote,
compared to PSOE's 38%. Two regional parties, the CC (the Canaries Coalition, a
coalition of 5 parties in the Canary Islands) and the CiU (Convergence and Union, a
coalition of the Democratic convergence of Catalonia and the Democratic Union of
Catalonia), combined their representatives with the Popular Party's 156 seats to take
control of the 350-seat Congress. Aznar, the leader of the Popular Party, became the
Prime Minister, referred to in Spain as the President of the Government, Spain
Government-2003, available at http://www.theodora.com/wfb2003/spain/spain-gov
ernment.html; See also John Hopper and Adela Gooch, Catalonia Offers No Homage
To Aznar, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 5, 1996, at 12 (for 1996 and 1993 general
election results); Daniel Williams, In Spain, an "Average" Politician Is Off to an
Extraordinary Start, WASH. POST, May 16, 1996, at A22. In the March 2000 elections
the Popular Party won 44.5% of the vote and 183 seats to take an absolute majority in
the Congress. Aznar, the leader of the Popular Party, remained President of the
government. CENTmAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK 2003: SPAIN (2003),
available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sp.html.
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While still in the opposition, the Popular Party had been vocal in
its criticism of Cuba.237  This rhetoric continued as Aznar
denounced one party rule in Cuba.238 Castro, in turn, refused to
accredit the Spanish Ambassador for some months.23 Despite the
politics, Spanish investment in Cuba continued apace.2 40 More-
over, Spain continued to view Cuba as special. As one observer
commented: "Cuba is not just a communist country, 'a Poland' in
the Caribbean. Castro isn't the leader of a distant Eastern Euro-
pean country: he's a Galician!"241
At the time the Popular Party came to power in Spain, Cuba
was reeling from an economic crisis. The collapse of communist
governments in Eastern Europe during 1989-1990, followed by the
implosion of the Soviet Union,242 led to drastic reductions in trade
and in subsidies.2 3 As living conditions plummeted, an increasing
number of Cubans tried to leave on small boats, heading for the
United States. 244 When anti-government demonstrations intensi-
fied in Cuba," Castro announced that the Cuban government
237. Roy, Espaha, la Union Europea y Cuba, supra note 207, at 1.
238. Pascal Fletcher, Cuba and Spain Mend Fences, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 7,
1998, at 2.
239. Cuba rejected the Spanish ambassador in November 1996. Pablo Alfonso,
Spain Denies Cuban Asylum-Seekers are Hiding in Embassy, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 27,
1996. See also FLETCHER, supra note 238, at 2. In April 1998, Aznar named a new
ambassador to Havana and he was accepted. Spanish-Cuban Relations Thaw With
Naming of Ambassador, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 2, 1998.
240. Roy, Espaha, la Union Europa y Cuba, supra note 207, at 12-20.
241. Id. at 3.
242. On December 26, 1991, the USSR morphed into the Commonwealth of the
Independent States (CIS). See Francis X. Clines, End of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev,
Last Soviet Leader, Resigns, U.S. Recognizes Republics' Independence, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1991, at Al.
243. The USSR contributed nearly $3 billion in subsidies to Cuba (sources indicate
subsidies from $2-3 billion). See John Pearson et al. (ed.), Gorbachev Will Soon Make
Castro More of an Island, BUSINESS WEEK, July 16, 1990, at 47; Thomas L. Friedman,
Soviet Turmoil: Gorbachev Says He's Ready to Pull Troops out of Cuba and End
Castro's Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at Al; TRAVIEso-DIAZ, supra note 25,
at 243.
244. The Coast Guard intercepted 63 Cubans in 1988, 368 in 1989, 430 in 1990,
1,936 in 1991, 2,336 in 1992, 3,687 in 1993, and 37,191 in 1994. USCG, Coast Guard
Migrant Interdictions at Sea, Calendar Year 1982-2000, available at http://www.
uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl]mle/amiostatsl.htm#fy [hereinafter Coast Guard Migrant
Interdictions at Sea]; see also Susan Martin, Andy Schoenholtz, Deborah Waller
Meyers, Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543, 556 (1998) (reporting that the U.S. Coast Guard picked up
8,500 Cubans from 1991-1993, which increased to 3,600 in 4 months in 1994).
245. Cubans forced their way into the Belgian, German, and Chilean embassies in
Havana in order to seek asylum. They commandeered Cuban tugboats to try to
escape. One such commandeered boat was rammed by the Cuban Coast Guard in
Havana harbor on July 13, 1994, leading to the deaths of more than 40 trying to
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would not enforce the exit restrictions.2" Over 30,000 Cubans
took to the sea in small boats and rafts."7 They did not head for
Spain, of course, but for Florida.
Determined to avoid a repeat of the Mariel situation, Presi-
dent Clinton announced that Cubans would not be allowed to land
in the United States, but instead would be taken to the U.S. Naval
base at Guantdnamo Bay in Cuba.248 To deter others from leaving
Cuba, Clinton ordered U.S. ships to intercept the balseros, or raft-
ers, and made arrangements to transport the Cubans plucked
from the sea to facilities in other countries in the region .21 Within
a month, the United States housed 32,000 Cubans in tents at
Guant6namo Bay and at a military base in Panama.2'1 Facing a
migration crisis, Cuba and the United States entered into a new
pact.25' Castro agreed to reinstate Cuban efforts to stop illegal
and unsafe departures by sea."2 The United States agreed to
allow 20,000 Cubans to immigrate annually, based on processing
that would take place in Cuba."3
escape. See Amnesty International, Cuba: The Sinking of the "13 De Marzo" on 13,
July 1994, AI Index AMR 25/013/1997, at 1; Mireya Navarro, Flight From Cuba;
Cuban Exiles Turn Funeral Into Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994; Steven
Greenhouse, Cuban Jitters: U.S. Takes A Hard Line, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1994;
Masud-Piloto, supra note 95, at 137. Riots erupted in Havana on Aug. 5, 1994. Id.
Bill Gertz, Castro Ploy Has Double Edge WASH. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1994; Exodus Relieves
Cuban Unrest, Embarrasses U.S, WAHi. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1994, at Al; see also
TRAVIEzo-DIAz, supra note 25 at 243; NAVARRO, supra note 95, at 1.
246. Aug. 5, 1994. See Fidel Castro, Comments While Touring Malecon, Aug. 6,
1994, available at httpJflanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1994/19940806; U.S. Picks
Up Cuban Group Near Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at A12; See also MASUD-
PILOTO, supra note 95, at 137-138.
247. See Migration-Cuba, supra note 236.
248. Douglas Jehl, Flight from Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Aut. 20, 1994. Presidential News
Conference: Clinton Changes Policy on Cuba, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 2472 (Aug. 20,
1994); MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 140-141.
249. Id.
250. More than 8,000 Cubans were taken to Howard Air Force Base in Panama and
more than 30,000 to GuantAnamo Naval Base in Cuba. Maria Sartori, The Cuban
Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the U.S. Policy of Temporary Protection in
Offshore Safe Havens, 15 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 319 (2001).
251. Joint Communique Between the United States and Cuba Concerning
Normalizing Migration Procedures, Sept. 9, 1994, 35 I.L.M. 327, 329 (1996) available
at 1994 WL 621517 (last visited June 2, 2003).
252. Id. See Paul Lewis, Cuba Vows to End Exodus in Return for a Rise in Visas,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1994, Al; Steven Greenhouse, Critics Warn that Immigration
Pact Leave Many Cuban Issues Unresolved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1994, A4; Steven
Greenhouse, Freewheeling Ways Pay Off for the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1994, A8.
253. Joint Communique, supra note 252. Six months later, the United States and
Cuba announced a further agreement. Cuba-United States: Joint Statement on
Normalization of Migration, Building on the Agreement of September 9, 1994, May 2,
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For the first time, the United States treated Cubans as ordi-
nary immigrants and thus refused to allow them to enter the
country."4 In an even more astounding shift in policy, the United
States returned Cubans to the Castro government.2 55 The 1994
1995, 35 I.L.M. 327 (1996). Cuba, again, promised to halt illegal departures. The
United States decided to admit the 21,000 Cubans already present at the U.S. Navy
Base at Guantdnamo Bay, but announced that in the future the United States would
stop small boats and return the passengers to Cuba. Migration-Cuba, supra note 236,
at 2.
In the 1995 Statement, Cuba agreed not prosecute or otherwise take reprisals
against returnees as a consequence of their failed attempt to emigrate illegally, but
Cuban returnees are often prosecuted for crimes, such as hijacking, committed during
their departure. See U.S. Dep't. of State, Daily Press Briefing at 7-8 (Feb. 13, 1997),
available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9702/970213.html. Recently,
Cuba convicted and executed three who had hijacked boats in efforts to flee Cuba.
David Gonzalez, Cuba Executes Three Who Tried To Reach U.S. in a Hijacking, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2003, at A2. See also, e.g., Abby Goodnough, G.O.P. Legislators in
Florida Criticize Bush On Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at A16 (reporting on trial
of Cubans who commandeered government boat, returned by U.S. to Cuba, on
condition that they not face prison terms greater than ten years).
Pursuant to the agreement, the U.S. agreed to admit Cuban refugees who can
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, and other Cubans pursuant to two
general U.S. immigration programs: family reunification and the lottery. Based on
family reunification, Cubans who are close relatives of U.S. citizens can enter the
United States to join their spouses, children, parents, or siblings who are legally
residing there. Those with close relatives can immigrate quickly. Others, whose U.S.
relatives are more distant relations, face much longer waiting periods. The Special
Cuban Migration program, known as the "Cuban lottery," allows Cubans between the
ages of 18 and 55 to apply to immigrate to the United States so long as they qualify on
at least two of the following grounds: they have completed secondary education, they
have three years of work experience, they have relatives living in the United States.
Migration-Cuba, supra note 236, at 2-3.; U.S.Dep't. of State, Office of Cuban Affairs,
Fact Sheet: The Cuban Adjustment Act (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://www.state.
gov/www/regions/wha/cubalcuba-adjustmentact.html Together, these two programs
select the 20,000 Cuban immigrants admitted to the United States annually. The
numbers related to refugee protection are much lower. Thus far, the refugee
processing unit in Havana has admitted nearly 4,000 refugees to the United States.
U.S. Dep't. of State, U.S. Interests Section, Havana, available at http://
usembassy.state.gov/havana/wwwhref.html. Although the U.S. does not have
diplomatic relations with Cuba, there is a U.S. Interests Section in the Swiss
Embassy in Havana. The "in-country" refugee program adheres to the refugee
definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention except it does not apply the limitations
that refugees must have already departed the country where they fear persecution.
254. See MASuD-PILOTO, supra note 95, at 140-141.
255. Id. at 143-144. Critics harshly denounced the new policy of returning Cubans
to Cuba as a violation of international law and an immoral act of cooperation with an
oppressive regime. Id. at 143. See, e.g., A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind; In Irons to
Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at A31. In response, the United States asserted that
all those stopped at sea or near the U.S. Naval Base at Guantdnamo Bay would be
interviewed to determine if they had a well-founded fear of persecution. Those
determined to be refugees would not be returned to Cuba, but resettled in countries
other than the United States. The United States further vowed to protect Cuban
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agreement, supplemented by a further agreement in 1995,"6 sub-
stantially affected Cuban migration to the United States. U.S.
government authorities intercept hundreds of Cubans at sea." 7
Rather than being taken to a welcoming American port and
admitted to the United States as in the past, these Cubans are
repatriated to Cuba.21 Moreover, the United States, in accor-
dance with the agreement, now processes 20,000 entry visas
annually in Cuba.
In conjunction with this dramatic shift in policy, the United
States announced it would apply its refugee law to Cubans. Those
intercepted at sea would have the right to an asylum interview.26
If they could show a well-founded fear of persecution, rather than
being returned to Cuba, they would be resettled in countries other
than the United States.26 1 Moreover, the United States further
vowed to protect Cuban refugees by maintaining a refugee
processing program in Havana.262
refugees, as opposed to economic migrants, by maintaining a U.S. refugee processing
program in Havana. ALEINIKOFF ET AL, supra note 144, at 1174.
256. See supra note 253.
257. Between May 1995 and Jan. 1997, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted 656
Cubans at sea. ALEINIKOFF ET AL, supra note 144, at 1174. See also U.S. Committee
for Refugees, Cuba Imposes Stiff Prison Terms on Cubans Interdicted and Returned
(Feb. 1997), available at http://www.refugees.org/worldlarticles/cubarr97-2.htm. The
Coast Guard picked up 931 Cubans at sea in 2002 and close to 900 in the first half of
2003. Abby Goodnough, G.O.P. Legislators in Florida Criticize Bush On Cuba, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at A16.
258. See Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions at Sea, supra note 244. Those who
display a "credible fear of persecution" have been taken to Guantdnamo for further
interviews, after which some of them have been resettled as refugees elsewhere. More
than 85% of Cubans intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard between May 1995 and Jan.
1997 were returned to Cuba, while fifteen individuals were brought to the U.S.,
ALEINIKOFF ET AL, supra note 144, at 1174. Simultaneously, thousands have been
admitted to the US as refugees after processing in Cuba. Id. See Refugee Reports,
Feb. 28, 1997, at 7. 1,587 Cubans were admitted as refugees directly from Cuba in
1998. U.S. Committee for Refugees, Country Report: Cuba (1999), available at http:/
www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/amer_carib//1999/cuba.htm
259. See supra notes 251-253.
260. See Phyllis A. Coven, Director, INS Office of International Affairs,
Memorandum from the Office of International Affairs, INS, Shipboard Processing of
Cubans (Aug. 9, 1995), reprinted as appendix to Cuban Update: INS Issues Shipboard
Processing Guidelines, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1407 (Oct. 16, 1995); Clinton
Administration Reverses Policy on Cubans, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 622 (May 8,
1995).
261. Id.
262. Id. Close to 4,000 Cubans were admitted to the US as refugees after
processing in Cuba in FY 1996, Refugee Reports, Feb. 28, 1997, at 7, and 1,587
Cubans were admitted as refugees directly from Cuba in 1998. U.S. Committee for
Refugees, Country Report: Cuba (1999), available at http'/www.refugees.org/world/
countryrpt/amerscarib//1999cuba.htm.
CUBAN EXCEPTIONALISM
The new approach, although diametrically opposed to the
assumptions underlying the prior laws regarding Cuban immigra-
tion, did not repeal the earlier legislation. As a consequence,
Cubans now confront two wildly different policies known as the
"wet foot, dry foot" phenomenon.2 6 If intercepted at sea ("wet
foot"), Cubans will not be allowed to enter the United States.2" If
they reach the United States ("dry foot"), Cubans are paroled into
the country and after a short time are eligible for lawful perma-
nent residence status. Those with dry feet need not show persecu-
tion, only Cuban origin.6 Cuban exceptionalism still reigns in
the United States, but it has been drastically limited.
The balsero exodus had little impact on the other side of the
Atlantic in Spain. To provide a vivid example, as more than
30,000 Cubans set sail for the United States in 1994, only 830
Cubans applied for asylum in Spain.166 The numbers grew stead-
ily smaller for the rest of the decade.6 7 Fewer than 500 arrived in
1995; fewer than 400 in 1996; fewer than 300 in 1997; barely 200
in 1998; around 300 in 1999.268
Suddenly, however, Spain experienced a surge in the number
of Cuban asylum seekers. More than 800 applied for asylum in
2000.2m The Aznar government, which had been applying the
Spanish asylum statute that incorporated the international refu-
gee definition to all those who requested asylum in Spain, contin-
ued to apply it to the Cubans. Almost all of the Cubans were
deemed to lack a well-founded fear of persecution. Viewing the
Cubans as migrants, not refugees, and in all likelihood remember-
ing the effectiveness of Clinton's response to the Cubans seeking
263. See, e.g., Roland Estevez, Modern Application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of
1966 and the Helms-Burton: Adding Insult to Injury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1273, 1290
(2002); David Cazares, Tragedy at Sea Puts Spotlight on U.S. Policy, SouTH FLORIDA
SUN-SENTINAL, Nov. 22, 2001, at 42A; Sean Garcia, Cuban Boy's Ordeal Highlights
Problems in Immigration Policies, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 10, 2000, at A23.
264. The U.S. policy is that those fleeing persecution in Cuba will be resettled
outside the U.S. See supra notes 260-263; see infra notes 224-266 and accompanying
text.
265. The towering significance of evading U.S. ships patrolling the sea passages
between Cuba and Florida reaching the U.S. coast has, of course, encouraged groups
that charge to smuggle Cubans into the United States. Castro has often railed
against smuggling operations that he claims are established by Cuban Americans.
Cazares, supra note 263, at 2.
266. OAR Annual Report for 2000, supra note 8, at 47, Figura 3.18.
267. Id.
268. The precise numbers: 495 in 1995, 389 in 1996, 283 in 1997, 208 in 1998, and
280 in 1999. Id.
269. There were 801 Cuban asylum seekers in 2000. Id.
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to reach the United States in 1994, the Spanish authorities
threatened to send those Cubans whose asylum applications had
been rejected back to Cuba."' In protest, angry Cubans went on a
hunger strike, and the Spanish government backed away from the
threats.27'
Asylum seekers continued to arrive from Cuba. At the begin-
ning of 2001, roughly 150 Cubans per month were requesting asy-
lum in Spain. By the end of the year there were 500 Cuban
asylum seekers per month. Indeed, on December 30, 2001, 100
Cubans requested asylum in a single day.272 More than 3,000
Cubans sought asylum in Spain in 2001, almost four times as
many as in the prior year.273 By 2001, 90% of the asylum seekers
who arrived at the Madrid International Airport were Cubans. 4
Although the numbers of Cuban asylum seekers in Spain
might seem minuscule by United States standards, these rapid
increases put a strain on the Spanish asylum system and worried
the government. No other European country faced an influx of
Cuban asylum seekers, a phenomenon that was due to the conflu-
ence of Cuba's historical ties with Madrid and Cuba's more recent
connection with Moscow. Cuban law, which requires those who
wish to leave to possess both Cuban exit permits and entry per-
mits for the destination country, generally prevents Cuban migra-
tion to Europe.275 All European countries, including Spain,
require Cubans to obtain a visa in order to enter and, as a general
rule, the European consular officers in Havana do not provide
entry visas to Cubans.' Spanish consular officials in Havana
270. MIGRATION POLICY GROUP, MIGRATION NEws SHEET, No. 229/2002-04, April
2002, at 17.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. COD. PEN. art. 216 (Cuba 1979) criminalizes illegal departure and provides for
imprisonment for up to 3 years or a fine of 300 to 1000 pesos ($12 to $40), with greater
penalties, imprisonment up to 8 years, if force or intimidation is used. See also COD.
PEN. art. 217 (Cuba 1979), available at http://www.gacetaoficial.cu/codigo-penalj 12 t4
_htm.htm. Amnesty International, United States/Cuba: Cuban "Rafters" - Pawns
of Two Governments, Al Index AMR 51/86/94, at 1, 8-9 (1994) [hereinafter Amnesty].
See U.S. Dep't of State, 2002, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cuba 19
(2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18327.htm [hereinafter
2002 Country Report].
276. See E.U. Council Regulation 539/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 81/1) (listing the third
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement), available at
http://europa.eu.intleur-lex/prilen/ojldat12001/l_081/ -08120010321en0010007.
pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2003). There are also financial barriers. The Cuban
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generally deny Cubans entry visas as well.
Russia, however, does not impose a visa requirement on
Cubans. Rather, a letter of invitation from a Russian citizen suf-
fices.277 Because a number of Russians married Cubans and made
their homes in Cuba, there is a network for obtaining letters of
invitation to Russia.27 With such a letter of invitation in hand,
many Cubans obtained an exit visa from Cuba.2 79 They then
boarded an airplane bound for Moscow, which generally made a
stopover in Madrid, a long-standing connection between Havana
and European destinations."' When the plane landed in Madrid,
many passengers got off and requested asylum.'
Even though the Cuban asylum seekers lacked entry visas for
Spain, the Spanish authorities housed them in the temporary liv-
ing quarters at the airport and reviewed their applications in an
expedited fashion. Many of the asylum seekers put forth economic
reasons for their departure from Cuba, which do not satisfy the
legal requirements for asylum in Spain.282 Others alleged a fear of
political persecution, but the circumstances of their departure
from Cuba tended to undercut their statements. All of the Cuban
asylum seekers at the Madrid airport had obtained exit visas from
Cuba in order to be allowed to board the airplane in Havana. In
light of the Cuban government's history of denying exit visas to
political dissidents,8 8 this suggested that asylum seekers dis-
embarking in Madrid from the Havana to Moscow flight were
unlikely to face persecution in Cuba. Although the Spanish
government charges $150 for an exit visa, $50 for a passport, and $400 for a medical
exam that is sometimes required. The Cuban government requires round trip air
tickets, which costs approximately $1,000 for a trip to Europe. Armando Soler, Lo que
cuesta salir de Cuba, CUBANET INDEPENDIENTE, available at http://www.cubanet.org/C
News/y02/jul02/02a6.htm. These fees are very high for Cubans, whose per capita
GDP is $1,700. Nations of the World, Cuba, WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS
2003, 776-77 (2003).
277. Migration News Sheet, supra note 270, at 17.
278. Id.
279. There are financial costs here, too. The fee to "legalize" the letter of invitation
is $100. The fee for an exit visa is $150. Id.; see also Armando Soler, Lo que cuesta
salir de Cuba, supra note 277.
280. Interview with Pablo Santolaya Machetti, supra note 125.
281. Some fly to Moscow first, and seek asylum in Spain when their return flight
stops in Madrid. Migration News Sheet, supra note 270, at 17.
282. Id.
283. Cuba denies exit visas arbitrarily, on occasion requires huge fees for exit visas,
and prosecutes those apprehended leaving without exit visas. The recent prosecution
of Pedro Riera Escalante for illegally leaving Cuba resulted in a six-year prison
sentence. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002: CUBA 141-142, available at
http'/hrw.org/wr2k2/americas5.html.
5692004]
570 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3
authorities did not invoke a formal presumption against the
Cuban applicants and interviewed the Cuban asylum seekers
individually, they denied asylum in almost every case." 4
The negative decision was not the end of the story, however.
Almost all the Cuban asylum seekers, even though they lacked
citizenship in Spain, lacked visas to enter Spain, and lacked a sub-
stantial claim for asylum in Spain, still gained entry into the
country.28 Spain adopted an expedient approach: it denied asy-
lum, but utilized the general immigration law to allow the rejected
Cuban asylum seekers to enter the country for 60 days.8 6 This
permitted the Cubans to reside legally while they looked for work,
which might provide the basis for obtaining a residence visa. 87
Those who managed to regularize themselves during that
extremely short period could extend their 60-day residence
permits.
It was impossible in practice, however, for almost anyone,
including Cubans, to secure a valid residence or work permit in
two months.2 8 Even if the Cuban community in Madrid supplied
housing, employment, and other assistance, the Spanish adminis-
tration moves slowly in assessing and acknowledging legal resi-
dence.28 9 Consequently, Cubans ended up as illegal immigrants
284. Spain has a two-stage asylum procedure. First, asylum applications are
reviewed to see if the applicant passes certain threshold criteria. Those whose
requests do not satisfy the first stage proceed into the second stage of the asylum
procedure. Migration News Sheet, supra note 270, at 17. Many officials and lawyers
who worked with asylum seekers in Spain reported that the Cuban officials were
unlikely to provide exit visas to those who might be targets of persecution.
Furthermore, they noted that dissidents and opponents of the Cuban government
were more likely to go to the United States if they could leave Cuba because the
community of anti-Castro activists is much larger in the United States than in Spain.
Interviews on file with the author. Interview with Pablo Santolaya Machetti,
Professor of Constitutional Law, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain, (March 13,
2002).
285. Migration News Sheet, supra note 271, at 17.
286. Id. Art. 25.4 of the Aliens Law, Organic Law 8/2000 of Dec. 22, 2000, amending
Organic Law 4/2000 of Jan. 11, 2000 (concerning the rights, liberties, and social
integration of aliens in Spain), Santolaya Machetti, supra note 9 (foreigners who do
not satisfy the entry requirements may be allowed to enter Spain based on
humanitarian reasons).
287. Migration News Sheet, supra note 270, at 17.
288. Id.
289. For example, the author, as a citizen of one of the countries in the European
Union, has a right under Spanish law to live and work in Spain, and applied promptly
for a residence permit in Spain. It took more than five months for the ministerial
process to grant the residence permit. It took more than one year for the author's son
to receive his permit to reside in Spain, by which time he already completed the school
year and departed.
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within a few weeks. Once the Cubans' temporary residence per-
mits expired, however, the Spanish authorities were unlikely to
track them down. 9 Indeed, there is no known instance of depor-
tation of a Cuban whose short-term entry visa has expired.9 l
Thus, throughout 2000 and 2001, Cubans continued to live in
Spain, albeit in a precarious situation given their lack of legal sta-
tus. An ability to speak Spanish and a familiarity with Spanish
culture, however, allowed them to blend into society more effec-
tively than many other illegal immigrants. For its part, Spain
continued to maintain solidarity with Cubans who reached their
borders. At the same time, the Spanish authorities avoided
expanding the definition of those entitled to asylum, which would
set a precedent that could be utilized by others.
The preferential treatment afforded Cubans led to great criti-
cism. Refugee organizations loudly protested the rejection of asy-
lum applicants from war-torn and dangerous countries, such as
Nigeria and Colombia, and compared the expulsion of these
rejected asylum seekers with the treatment given to Cubans.29 2
Repeating the vociferous arguments made in the United States
about the disparate treatment accorded the Haitians and the
Cubans,9 3 Spanish advocates demanded that their government
extend the generous "Cuban" approach to rejected asylum seekers
from countries where the risks to life and freedom upon return
were greater than the risks likely to be faced by Cubans who had
obtained exit visas from Cuban authorities.294
Spain's response was similar to that of the United States a
decade earlier in two respects. Both governments reacted to the
charges of discrimination by essentially extending the less protec-
tive approach to Cubans, rather than extending the less restric-
tive approach to other asylum seekers. Moreover, both
governments essentially took action to stop Cuban asylum seekers
at their source - in Cuba. Because Cubans came to the United
290. Migration News Sheet, supra note 270, at 17.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., Malissia Lenox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique
of the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 687 (1993); Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., America's Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class and Reason,
41 B.C. L. REv. 755 (2000); Rick Bragg, Haitian Immigrants in U.S. Face a Wrenching
Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2000, at Al; Noah Isakson, Immigration Inequity Cited:
Cubans Welcome, Haitians in Limbo, Jackson Says, CHIC. TRiB., Apr. 26, 2000, at N3;
States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 687 (1993).
294. MIGRATION POLICY GROUP, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, No. 226/2002-01, Jan.
2002, at 17.
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States by sea, the United States began to interdict Cubans in
boats and rafts as they left Cuban waters. Because Cubans
arrived in Spain by air, Spain adopted a policy to prevent them
from boarding the airplane in Havana. In the spring of 2002,
Spain began requiring Cubans, as well as Colombians, to obtain a
Spanish transit visa if they took a flight scheduled to stop in
Spain.295 More than 250 Cubans arrived at the Madrid airport in
the two days preceding the implementation of the transit visa
requirement.2 96 None of them was turned away. 297
Shortly after the transit visa regulation was imposed on
Cubans, eight Cubans landed at the Madrid airport without
transit visas and applied for asylum.298 Two were allowed to enter
Spain; one entry was based on family ties in Spain and one was
based on dissident political opinion.2 9 The others were refused
entry. 0 After a short hunger strike,30 1 they were deported but not
returned to Cuba. Instead, Spain returned the Cubans to Russia,
the destination of the flight they had boarded in Havana.0'
V. THE ANTI-MIGRATION USE OF ASYLUM PROCEDURES
My examination of the reception of Cuban asylum seekers in
Spain and the United States has shown that there are, indeed,
significant similarities. Both countries afforded special treatment
to Cubans for decades. Both Spain and the United States essen-
tially allowed Cubans to enter and remain, whether or not they
could demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. The magni-
tude of the numbers seeking asylum varied between the countries,
as well as the method of arrival, and, to some extent, the timing of
the arrival of Cubans differed. Nonetheless, Cubans who could
reach either Spain or the United States were assured entry. The
295. The Transit visa requirement became effective for Cubans on March 15, 2002.
Migration News Sheet, supra note 270, at 17. Earlier, Spain had imposed a transit
visa requirement on nationals of other countries, but not on Cubans, that were
required to have entry visas for Spain. This is another example of preferential
treatment for Cubans. Migration News Sheet, supra note 294, at 18. Interview, Beldn
Wallisen, Director, CEAR Legal Services for Madrid, in Madrid, Spain (Apr. 22,
2002).
296. Migration News Sheet, supra note 270, at 17.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. They had flown from Havana to Moscow via Ireland and their return flight
passed through Spain. Id.
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governments admitted them and provided them with shelter, food,
and substantial social services.
Some of the impulses behind the preferential treatment of
Cubans were the same in both countries. During the tense middle
decades of the Cold War, anti-communist emblems, such as refu-
gees fleeing a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Cuba, were powerful
in Spain, as well as the United States. More recently, Prime Min-
ister Aznar's denunciations of Castro as a dictator in a one-party
state have echoed the ideological responses to Cuba frequently
heard in the United States.
An anti-communist explanation is too simple, however, for the
preferential treatment Cubans have received in Spain. History
weighs heavily on Spain and Cuba, with a totally different emo-
tional force from that generated by United States - Cuba relations
during the past century. The exceptionally large migration from
Spain to Cuba in the twentieth century, the four centuries of colo-
nial rule, and the political symbol that Cuba became - Spain's
first and last colony- together make Spain's relationship with
Cuba much more than a Cold War battleground. For the
Spaniards, Cubans are family. They may be distant cousins.
Their families may have been absent for several generations.
They may not need protection from persecution, but they have
fallen on hard times and Spanish society does not want to turn
their Cuban relatives away.
In recent years, it is true that Spanish authorities have tried
to deter and impede Cuban asylum seekers from entering Spain.
As part of the European Union, Spain is likely to continue to
maintain these new restrictive measures and perhaps even to
intensify them. Those Cubans who do manage to reach Spain,
though, are likely to find that Spanish officials remain hesitant in
rejecting them.
This review of Cuban exceptionalism in Spain and the United
States has revealed that Cubans arriving in both countries during
the last forty years have received generous preferential treatment.
It also has revealed that Spain and the United States have fol-
lowed a similar pattern in responding to the Cubans who left after
Castro came to power. Neither Spain nor the United States
responded to these Cuban "refugees" by applying international
refugee law. Instead, both countries relied on discretionary deci-
sions by the executive to welcome the Cubans and to allow them to
enter. The officials and the press called the Cubans refugees, but
they responded to the Cubans as migrants.
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In other words, the United States and Spain did not respond
out of a sense of legal obligation to the hundreds of thousands of
Cubans leaving Cuba. As many have shown,"3 the United States
response was fueled in major part by ideology. As this article
demonstrates, the Spanish response largely stemmed from histor-
ical and cultural, rather than political, reasons.
It is true, of course, that neither Spain nor the United States
had ratified the major refugee treaty in 1959 when Cubans began
to arrive at their borders. Although not bound by the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention, they surely were aware of its terms and the inter-
national consensus on those entitled to refugee status. Moreover,
Spain and the United States later did become parties to the refu-
gee treaty and both adopted implementing legislation in the
1980s. Nonetheless, they essentially ignored refugee standards in
dealing with Cuban asylum seekers. When Cubans reached its
shores, the United States continued to use the immigration stat-
ute's parole provision to allow them to enter. There were no pesky
questions about persecution. Spain, in contrast, did ask Cuban
asylum seekers arriving in the last years of the twentieth century
if they feared persecution. Those who did not, or whom Spanish
officials thought lacked a well-founded fear, were still allowed to
enter, pursuant to the humanitarian exception of the general law
on foreigners.11
4
To be sure, international law does not require states to limit
their responses to migration, or even to forced migration, to the
standards and policies developed in the context of protecting refu-
gees. Nations may generously accept non-citizens into their terri-
tories for any reason - political, cultural, economic, sentimental,
moral, or some other rationale. Spain and the United States each
had its own motives for its generous welcome to Cubans.
Then, after decades of referring to the Cubans as refugees but
treating them like migrants, Spain and the United States both
changed their policies. They called them migrants, but screened
them to determine if they were refugees. In an ironic twist, Spain
and the United States both adopted the standards of refugee law
in order to curb a migration that they long had encouraged but
now wanted to halt.
The 1951 Refugee Convention does not attempt to control
migration; rather its purpose is more limited. It is an instrument
that coexists with immigration laws and supersedes them only in
303. See supra note 25.
304. See supra notes 282-285 and accompanying text.
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those instances where there is an arrival of non-citizens whose life
or freedom are threatened due to their race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a social group." 5 In that
sense, it does not violate the refugee treaty to use it to shut off
migration. So long as nations protect refugees, they have not vio-
lated the norms of international law, even if they turn others
away. Therefore, it is not inconsistent with refugee law for Spain
and the United States to move from a discretionary executive deci-
sion that allowed the entry of all Cubans to the application of leg-
islative standards that prohibit entry to all Cubans except for
those who can demonstrate a fear of persecution.
The use of the 1951 Refugee Convention standards in this
context seems ironic, however. The spirit of the treaty is one of
affording protection, of providing assistance to those who cannot
depend on their own governments for support and sustenance.
Instead, as Spain and the United States moved from discretionary
decisions to the application of law, they relied on the treaty's legal
standards to reduce the support offered to Cubans. The definition
incorporated in the 1951 Refugee Convention became the major
instrument of the policy decisions in both countries to withdraw
support from Cubans who seek to escape their homeland.
305. Geneva Convention, supra note 29. Although many states have enacted
national legislation admitting into their territory those who satisfy the refugee
definition contained in Art. I.A.(2) of the Geneva Convention, the Convention by its
own terms does not require state parties to admit those who meet its refugee
definition. The Geneva Convention does prohibit states from expelling or returning
refugees to territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened due to their
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group.
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